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Abstract
It is generally agreed that the identification of income wealth does not
provide all the relevant information needed to evaluate the quality of life:
income is but one component of overall individual wellbeing. Latest eco-
nomic contributions focus on the multidimensional nature of well-being
taking into account a number of life dimensions further than income (e.g.
health conditions, educational attainments). Moreover, as recently ar-
gued, freedom of choice plays a relevant role in the definition of quality of
life. Which criterion could be the most appropriate to allow for the mul-
tidimensional nature of well-being? Can freedom of choice be included in
such a comprehensive evaluation? This paper concerns a re-examination
of the notion of well-being within the functioning-capability approach pro-
posed by A.K. Sen. Following Sen’s framework we re-define the value of
achieved functionings in a way that takes note of alternative opportuni-
ties. We make operative a freedom-of-choice based refinement procedure
by partitioning the population into diﬀerent groups, homogeneous in some
discriminating objective characteristic (e.g. age, sex, location). Our aim
is to test whether the fact of showing a certain attribute poses an objec-
tive limit to a person’s opportunity to reach or exceed a given value of a
functioning.
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1 Introduction
The evaluation of well-being represents one of the most relevant issues in welfare
economics: the importance of the definition and evaluation of standard of living
lies in the fact that the chosen indicators will be used by policy makers in the
actual design of redistributive policies.
To focus the problem, let’s consider three persons. Person A lives in a very
rich family but she has a serious handicap, and she has no alternatives but
staying home: she cannot work and cultivate social relations. Person B is poor
in income, but he enjoys a very good health status: he is a Ph.D. student in
philosophy and he loves travelling. Finally, person C is a migrant, she has not
high school level and she belongs to the working class. Which of the three
persons has the higher well-being? Which of them deserve the highest support
from the government?
According to traditional welfarist approach, which evaluates diﬀerent social
states in terms of individual utility generated by the consumption of commodi-
ties, and empirically measures welfare in terms of income or consumption (con-
sidered the best proxy of utility), person A enjoys the highest level of well-being,
followed by C and B. Is this ranking correct? Is the traditional evaluation of
well-being adequate?
Recently, an increasing literature has agreed the traditional approach is in-
adequate for an accurate evaluation of living standard. Scholars (see, among
others, Barberà, Bossert and Pattanaik, 2003; Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu, 1994;
Dworkin, 1981; Gravel, 1994; Ok, 1997; Pattanaik and Xu, 1990, 1998, 2000;
Sen 1991, 1992; Sugden, 1998; Xu, 2002, 2004) argue for a more comprehensive
interpretation of well-being, by focusing on two basic ideas: the first idea is that
well-being represents a multidimensional notion, which only partially depends
to economic wealth, and which is linked to dimensions like health condition,
education, safety and self fulfillment. The second -perhaps more crucial- idea is
the individual freedom of choice is relevant in determining the level of well-being.
Within this literature Sen (1985, 1987, 1992) proposed a functioning-capability
approach, with the capability space being a particular space of individual op-
portunities and alternative achievements, among which a person can choose.
The main focus of this paper is to assess individual well-being in a way that
takes note of its multidimensional nature and the role of freedom of choice.
In the first section we present the functioning-capability approach proposed
by professor A. K. Sen; in section two we provide some consideration about the
opportunity to use Sen’s view to face the issue of well-being assessment focusing
on the notion of freedom of choice; section three concentrates on a set of criteria
which incorporate an element of freedom of choice in the evaluation of living
standard; in section four we present examples also based on empirical data. We
conclude the paper motivating our suggestion for a further specification for one
of the criteria presented in section 3. Under suitable properties our criterion
will allow to derive robust individual comparisons in terms of the freedom of
choice based refined functioning.
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1.1 The capability approach
Since the ’70s Sen launched a critique against the welfarism as a normative
theory, and proposed a new framework the assessment of well-being, which
he called capability approach: the capability approach stresses on the role of
individual freedom of choice and interpersonal diﬀerences in the definition of
human well-being.
Sen (1980, 1985, 1992) points out that there are dimensions of welfare which
are not completely captured by either the income earned or the available re-
sources. Income is necessary to buy commodities, which in turn help people
to satisfy material needs; however, there exist elements of life (such as health,
culture or self-respect) which do not depend upon material wealth. Thus, well-
being is fundamentally a multidimensional and complex notion. Sen’s approach
is able to account for the multidimensional nature of well-being as it character-
izes individual well-being in terms of what a person is actually able to do or to
be, i.e. in terms of his/her functionings: a functioning is an achievement of a
person, what the person succeeds in doing with the commodities and character-
istics at her command (see Sen, 1985). Thus, the functioning vector represents
the overall “state of being and doing” of a person.1
Related to that of functionings, Sen defines the concept of capability set.
The capability set represents a person’s opportunities to achieve well-being: it
reflects the alternative combinations of functionings that a person may achieve,
given her personal characteristics, the environmental circumstances, and her
preferences. Thus the capability set incorporates the freedom of choice of
agents2. An illustrative example may be useful to understand the notion of
capability: suppose that a person can choose between diﬀerent functioning vec-
tors a, b, c and d, and that she chooses a. Now consider the case that vectors b,
c and d become unavailable to the person, while a remains the only accessible
alternative: at first glance, it seems that the agent’s living standard remains un-
changed as she would choose the vector a anyway. However, we must agree that
the person’s well-being has been reduced due to the limitation of her freedom
of choice.
1Functionings include elementary things like being alive, being well-nourished or sheltered,
being in good health. Also, there are more complex functionings such as having self-respect,
cultivating intellectual attitudes, appearing in public without shame etc. The former are re-
ferred to as basic functionings, and they assume a key role especially in less developed societies
in which a number of persons must face starvation and health disease; latter forms of function-
ings become fundamental in the richest societies, in which it is presumed that the majority of
people has means to escape basic needs. Functionings must be distinguished from commodi-
ties: the latter are objects which persons might buy and use, while each functioning represents
an aspect of living itself (see Sugden, 1993). Functionings are also to be distinguished from
utilities: according to Sen utility takes the form of the subjective happiness resulting from the
achievement of a functioning.
2 In this paper the concept of freedom of choice must be interpreted in a positive rather
than negative sense, ”that is, in terms of ’freedom to’ rather than ’freedom from”’ (see Sugden,
1993). Sen argues that positive freedom of choice is a good on itself, has an intrinsic value:
being free to choose how to live one’s own life is one of the eﬀective dimensions of well-being.
At the same time, Sen points out that freedom of choice is not merely a functioning. Rather,
it must be identified with the capability set.
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Formally, consider xi is a vector of commodities possessed by a person i, c(.)
is the function which converts commodities vector in a vector of characteristics
of those commodities. Also, consider fi(.) being a personal utilization function,
which transforms the characteristic vector c(xi) in a functioning vector bi, where
bi = fi(c(xi)).Function fi(.) reflects the pattern of use of commodities that per-
son i (and only person i) can actually make, given her personal abilities and the
environmental circumstances. The way the commodity vector can be converted
in a functioning vector, then, will depend on the own person characteristics.
Given this characterization of individual standard of living, the main prob-
lem now becomes how to assess well-being in the capability space.
2 Use the capability approach to evaluate indi-
vidual well-being
In the first section we have briefly illustrated Sen’s approach: now we attempt
to motivate the opportunity to use Sen’s framework for actual assessment of
the living standard: how do we arrive to a measure of overall well-being which
incorporate the notion of freedom of choice? How do we measure the freedom
of choice?
In fact the multidimensional nature of well-being and the complex structure
of the capability approach make its operationalization a diﬃcult task. Such
operationalization for practical assessment of human well being requires the
dealing with a number of issues, and above, it is related with the choice of an
adequate methodology for evaluating functioning indicators.
As we have seen in Section 1, the bi vector represents the overall “state of
being and doing” of person i: Sen points out the possibility to evaluate bi by
using an objective evaluation function v(.). This objective evaluation function
may represent the starting point for well-being assessment. However, function
v(.) is restricted to the evaluation of functionings, while it ignores a consideration
of individuals’ capability set as it does not take into account the individual’s
freedom of choice.3
In order to incorporate the freedom of choice in the analysis of individual
well-being Sen provides a number of suggestions. Among them he introduces
the notion of refined functioning: where the value of the achieved functionings
evaluated according to v(.) are refined by taking into account an element of
freedom of choice. Complementing the value of v(.) with the “freedom factor”
will lead to a more accurate assessment of living standard.
3The choice between functioning vector and capability set is a fundamental one in the
analysis and empirical evaluation of personal well-being. On the one hand, functionings are
more closely related to the actual living standards of people: thus, we might argue that the
assessment of the value of functioning vector is suﬃcient to reach an adequate evaluation of
well-being. On the other hand, Sen considers the capability space the more adequate sphere for
evaluating the level of well-being, as it embodies the freedom of individuals: by choosing the
capability set as the relevant space for the analysis of well-being, we may assess the person’s
standard of living under diﬀerent situation, and arrive to a more appropriate valuation of
well-being.
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According to Sen a refined functioning takes the form (bi|S) of “reach the
functioning bi given the choosing set S”. This criterion tries to relate the value
of functioning bi with a choosing set S, that provides a metric of freedom of
choice.
In the next section we will try to provide a characterization of an objective
evaluation function of capability by applying the concept of refined functioning
as described by Sen.
3 A freedom-of-choice based refinement func-
tion
The possibility to evaluate well-being which incorporates an element of freedom
of choice is related to the definition of a functional representation of individual
refined functionings. Thus the objective of this section is to define a freedom-
of-choice based refinement function.
Diﬀerent paths can be followed to accomplish the task: we follow the ax-
iomatic approach proposed by recent literature which suggests to incorporate
the notion of freedom of choice in the analysis of individual well-being by in-
troducing the notion of opportunity set (see Peragine, 1998). Opportunity set
is the set of all alternatives available to individual, from which she can choose
the outcome she prefers (see Pattanaik and Xu 1990, 1998, Bossert et al. 1997,
Kranich 1996, 1997).
If we combine the axiomatic methodology proposed by the literature on
opportunity sets and the notional framework of the capability approach, we may
arrive to characterize a freedom of choice based refined functioning. As a by-
product of the analysis the methodology we suggest can be considered a possible
solution to the problem of operationalize the notion of capability set of the
individuals.
The formal framework employed here refers to the notation proposed in Sen
(1985), but it can be also related to the literature on opportunity set ranking.
Suppose there is a non-empty universal set of functionings P , finite and with
cardinality |P |. These functionings describe all possible states of being and
doing available to individuals belonging to a community, so that P constitutes
the set of fundamental components of well-being. Population is composed of n
individuals, where n is a finite number. Each person i (i = 1, 2, ..., n) has a non-
empty and finite subset of P , which we call the capability set Qi. Within the
capability set each person may achieve a functioning vector, which represents
her overall state of being and doing, embodying all the relevant dimensions of
her life. The realization of functioning by the individual i depends on two main
aspects:
1. her preferences;
2. and her freedom of choice.
Obviously we cannot provide an objective metric of preferences: yet, we
are able to observe the concrete functioning achieved by each individual, and
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compare it with that of other individuals. Each functioning is determined by
an indicator which can assume dichotomous or ordinal values. Given the ob-
served indicator, it is possible to design the objective evaluative function v(.)
introduced in Section 1.
Once we have an opportune evaluation v(.) of observed functioning, we
wish to evaluate the freedom of choice of individual i by taking note of her al-
ternative opportunities. But, how can we proceed to take note of alternatives?
Theoretically, it would be necessary to compare the actual state of each indi-
vidual with all alternative states the same individual could have reached given
her personal characteristics, the environmental circumstances and the available
commodities (that is to asses the value of capability set Qi). However, at a
practical level, this is unfeasible as we do not know the potential and unrealized
alternative opportunities of agent i: yet, what we can do is to compare the
actual state of each individual with that of individuals who share with her one
of more personal objective characteristics (e.g. the age, the social background,
the household composition), and then to weight the value of functioning vector
according to the degree of freedom of choice correlated with the share of that
characteristic. The intuitive hypothesis is that there are some objective char-
acteristics which represent “factors of freedom”, as they aﬀect the capacity of
individuals of exercising the freedom of choice; thus, we suppose groups have a
constitutive importance in the definition of individuals’ capabilities. The pro-
cedure considers a society and establishes an ordering between diﬀerent groups
in terms of freedom of choice: by choosing one or more discriminating charac-
teristics (e.g. the gender and/or the class of age), we may group individuals
in K diﬀerent types according to that characteristic (if the characteristic is the
gender, k will assumes the alternative types ”male” and ”female”). Each group
is composed of nk individuals. We call Sk ∈ P the choosing set, including all
individuals sharing the characteristic k: the fact that a person belongs to a
certain subgroup may or may not limit her capacity to exercise the freedom
of choice. The choosing set Sk represents a target to estimate the freedom of
choice related to the possession of an objective characteristic, exogenous from
individual’s preferences: the higher the choosing space Sk, the larger the number
of valuable alternatives among which the individual can choose. On the other
hand, the actual realization in terms of functioning represents the preferences of
individuals: given a (more or less extended) number of alternatives, the agent
will choose the state of being or doing he/she prefers.
First we focus on one specific functioning, i.e. one specific aspect of overall
well-being: our objective is to evaluate the refined functioning bki achieved by
individual.
Let defined the refined functioning of individual i bki = (bi|Sk), with bki ∈
Sk: the value of this functioning is able to take note of the ‘counterfactual’
opportunities of individual (see Gravel, 1994).
Starting from the objective evaluation function v(bi) and taking note of
Sen’s suggestion about refined functioning, we propose a new evaluation func-
tion ω(bi|Sk).Each non-empty and finite set Sk can be identified with the nk-
dimensional vector (or the set) of its elements. Thus, it is possible to represent
6
function ω(.) as w(bi;bk), where bi represents the functioning reached by indi-
vidual i, and bk represents the vector of functionings achieved by individuals
(included individual i) belonging to the choosing set Sk. The set of all function-
ing vectors can be denoted by B, with bk ∈ B, the subset of all vectors with
size n is denoted by Bn.
We will consider levels of functioning achieved bi for agent i where given a
fixed level H of realizations the set of possible realizations is NH := {1, 2, 3...H}
where H ≥ 2. Similarly we denote by Nn the set of all individuals within a
group of size n, i.e. Nn := {1, 2, 3...n}. The vector of elements bi for individuals
belonging to group k of size nk ∈ N is bk ∈ (NH)nk . We define 1n the vector
of n elements, each taking value 1. Moreover we denote by Bn(bi) the set of all
n−dimensional vectors including the realization bi for agent i and Bn(bi, bj) :=
Bn(bi)∩Bn(bj), and more generallyBn(b, bt) := Bn(b)∩Bn(bt). It is important
to point out that even if functioning b are unidimensional (i.e. belong to the set
NH) they can embed multidimensional considerations, for instance each b can
be considered as a list of achievements of an individual or a list of spaces where
she is not-excluded. What we require in our analysis is a predefined order for
the set of functionings.
Since the set of possible achievements within a group of size n (i.e. Bn) is
finite with cardinality Hn, any transitive and complete binary relation defined
on Bn can be represent by an evaluation function. The result can be extended
to hold for B since the set B is countable (see Kreps, 1988). We define w(bi;b)
(dropping the group index k for expositional convenience) as the freedom-of-
choice based refined functioning.
Definition 1 (FCRF: Freedom of Choice based Refined Functioning)
Let bi ∈ NH , b ∈ Bn(bi) for any n ≥ 1. The function w(bi;b) such that
w : NH × (NH)n → R+ represents the functioning evaluation adjusted for the
freedom of choice based on the opportunities faced by individuals belonging to a
group whose distribution of functionings is given by vector b.
The function w(bi;b) characterizes individual well-being in terms of both
eﬀectively realized outcomes and positive freedom of choice.
We will derive axiomatically specifications of function w(bi;b) that are de-
composable into two functions:
v(bi) : objective evaluation function, related to the actual choice (it depends
on individual’s preferences, which are not explicit). We observe the concrete
value of functioning indicator, and rank individuals in terms of that indicator
(which can be evaluated by one or more variables).
φ(b) : evaluation function of freedom of choice, related to the element of
freedom linked with the objective discriminating characteristic (e.g. the sex,
the class of age etc...). Thus we will obtain the specification
w(bi;b) = v(bi) · φ(b) (1)
where v(bi) depends only on the functioning achieved by individual i and it is
non-decreasing in bi, that is v(b) ≥ v(b0) if b > b0. Moreover function φ(b) is
non-decreasing in each element of b.
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3.1 Axioms and characterizations
Now we introduce some axioms in order to describe some plausible properties
that the function wk(.) should satisfy. Since we will focus on properties defined
for members of a given group, in order to simplify the notation we will drop the
subscript k from any FCRF.
The first two axioms introduce some basic properties regarding the relation
between individuals within a group, in terms of achieved functioning. Let Π
denote a permutation matrix and π(i) : Nn → Nn a permutation operator
applied to index i ∈ Nn.
Axiom 1 ((A) Anonymity) For all bi ∈ NH , all b ∈ Bn(bi) and all permu-
tation matrices Π such that bi = bπ(i), then w(bi;b) = w(bπ(i);Πb).
The anonymity property requires that function w(bi;b) ignores the names
of individuals in the evaluation of achieved functioning, if individuals belong to
the same subgroup.
Axiom 2 ((WMA) Weak Monotonicity in Achievements) Let bi, bj ∈ NH ,
if bi ≥ bj then w(bi;b) ≥ w(bj ;b) for all b ∈ Bn(bi, bj).
The axiom of weak monotonicity in terms of the achieved functioning re-
quires that, given two individuals belonging to the same group, if the function-
ing bi is higher than functioning bj , then w(bi;b) will show a level of well-being
at least as high as the well-being related to function w(bj ;b).The comparison
depends only on the achievement of individuals i and j, not on the achievements
of the rest of agents belonging to the group.
Next property is crucial for the main characterizations of the FCRFs. It will
induce the multiplicative separability formulation of w as in (1). We consider
relative comparisons of FCRF of two distinct individuals i, j belonging to the
same subgroup.
Axiom 3 ((SRI) Strong Relative Independence) Let bi, bj ∈ NH , and b ∈
Bn(bi, bj) :
(i) If w(bi;b) = w(bj ;b) = 0 then w(bi;b0) = w(bj ;b0) = 0 for all b0 ∈
Bn(bi, bj).
(ii) If 0 < w(bi;b) ≤ w(bj ;b) then
w(bi;b)
w(bj ;b)
=
w(bi;b
0)
w(bj ;b0)
for all b0 ∈ Bn(bi, bj).
The first part of the axiom SRI tells us that there exists a minimum achieve-
ment level which is independent from the belonging to a certain group: if a
person experiences an extremely negative situation (a serious disease, or the
lack of all basic human rights), her condition cannot be compared or weighted
with that of other individuals, even though they belong to the same group. The
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second part of axiom SRI claims that, for acceptably high levels of achievement,
it is possible to compare the realization of individuals belonging to a given group:
this comparison is relative and independent from the group the two individuals
belong to.
In order to evaluate the eﬀect of the freedom of choice component we sug-
gest to consider an independence property requiring that the FCRF evaluation
is consistent with expansion of groups achievements obtained adding new indi-
viduals to the group experiencing the same functioning realization.
Axiom 4 ((IEF) Independence from External Functionings) Let b0, bi ∈
NH , b,b
0 ∈ Bn(bi), b1,b10 ∈ Bn+1(bi, b0), s.t. b1 = b ∪ b0 and b10 = b0 ∪ b0
then w(bi;b) ≥ w(bi;b0) if and only if w(bi;b1) ≥ w(bi;b10).
Axiom IEF seems a natural property to suggest it requires that if an indi-
vidual experience a larger FCRF once assigned to a group compared to another
group then adding the same functioning level to the distribution of the two
groups cannot induce a re-ranking in the comparison. As will turn out only
some of the main FCRF we will characterize satisfy this property.
Next property serves to make comparison easier and to simplify the analysis.
We consider the FCRF as a “membership function” whose realization quantifies
the degree to which an individual achievement (also encompassing the freedom
of choice component) contributes to experiencing fully a refined functioning.
Thus we move from a level 0 of no experience of a given FCRF when all the
group, including the individual experience the first level of the functioning, to
level 1 when all the group experience the highest level of the functioning.
Axiom 5 ((N) Normalization) w() = 1 and w() = 0.
The normalization axiom N claims that if individual i achieves the highest
level of refined functioning as do all the individuals in her reference group then
w(H;H · 1n) = 1, while if she completely fails in reaching functioning, as do
also all the individuals in her reference group then w(1;1n) = 0.
Next property will allow to extend comparisons over distributions of diﬀerent
population size.
Axiom 6 ((RI) Replication Invariance) w(bi;b) = w(bi;br), with br a vec-
tor of r replications of b.
The axiom RI tells that, if we consider two diﬀerent groups, with one ob-
tained by simply replicating r times each element of the other group, the value
of function w(.) remains unchanged. Given the vector b = (b1, b2, ..., bn),
the vector of functioning obtained by the replication procedure will be br =
(b1, b1, ...| {z }
r
, b2, b2, ...| {z }
r
, bn, bn, ...| {z }
r
)
Axiom 7 ((WM) Weak Monotonicity) Let b,b0 ∈ Bn(bi) if b ≥ b0, then
w(bi;b) ≥ w(bi;b0).
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The axiom WM introduces the idea that there exists a relation between
individual opportunities and the belonging to a certain subgroup: some groups
assure to individuals a more valuable set of alternatives than others. Thus,
the fact of belonging to this or that group may aﬀect the value of function
w(.). More precisely, if group b oﬀers to individual i more freedom of choice
than group b0, then the value of refined functioning w(bi;b) will be higher than
w(bi;b
0).
Next three properties introduce diﬀerent criteria to evaluate the opportuni-
ties faced by an individual belonging to a certain group.
First property requires to consider improvement in opportunities only when
the set of functioning experienced by the individuals belonging to an homo-
geneous group are enriched by a value above the previously existing maxi-
mum level. Let bmax denote the highest functioning within the vector b, i.e.
bmax := maxi∈Nn{bi : bi ∈ b}
Axiom 8 ((MR) Maximal Rule ) Let b∗, bi ∈ NH , b ∈ Bn(bi), b0 ∈ Bn+1(bi, b∗),
s.t. b0 = b ∪ b∗
(i) if b∗ > bmax then w(bi;b0) ≥ w(bi;b),
(ii) if b∗ ≤ bmax then w(bi;b0) = w(bi;b).
Axiom MR considers the best element observed within the subgroup as a tar-
get to evaluate the freedom of choice associated with the condition of belonging
to that group: the higher the value of functioning observed in a subgroup, the
higher the freedom of choice of individuals belonging to that group. The idea
is that given a functioning level b˜ ∈ NH the fact of belonging to a group where
no agents reach at least the functioning value b˜ does constitute an objective
limitation to the individual freedom of choice, if there are other groups showing
b˜. The agent belonging to the first group has not all the potential to achieve
high level of living standard.
Next Property TR requires to consider improvement in opportunities when
the set of functioning experienced by the individuals belonging to an homoge-
neous group are enriched by a value strictly above a given threshold.
Axiom 9 ((TR)Threshold Rule) Let b∗, bi, z ∈ NH , b ∈ Bn(bi), b0 ∈ Bn+1(bi, b∗),
s.t. b0 = b ∪ b∗,
(i) if b∗ > z then w(bi;b0) ≥ w(bi;b),
(ii) if b∗ ≤ z then w(bi;b0) = w(bi;b).
Axiom TR requires that, in order to evaluate the opportunities faced by
an individual, it is relevant to set a threshold z, and then assess the levels of
achievements experienced within a group depending on whether, and by how
many individuals the identified “critical level” is experienced. The threshold z
can be seen as a target value of functioning, considered adequate by reasonable
agents as an index of high living standard4.
4For example: take the functioning ”level of literacy”. If the maximal value observed is
the PhD level, yet we can choose the university degree level as a target, and discriminate
individuals according to that threshold.
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Finally, property TC requires that in order to evaluate the opportunities
faced by an individual it is relevant to set an absolute threshold, and then
assess the number of individuals belonging to the group exceeding that threshold
compared with individuals below the threshold.
Axiom 10 ((TC) Threshold Consistence) Let bi, bj , b0i ∈ NH , b ∈ Bn(bi, bj),
b0 ∈ Bn(b0i, bj), b∗−i ∈ Bn−1(bj) s.t. b = b∗−i ∪ bi, b0 = b∗−i ∪ b0i,
(i) if either [bi ≤ z, and b0i ≤ z], or [bi > z, and b0i > z]then w(bj ;b) =
w(bj ;b
0);
(ii) if [bi ≤ z, and b0i > z] then w(bj ;b0) ≥ w(bj ;b).
In other words the higher the number of agents exceeding the threshold
in a subgroup compared with individuals below the threshold, the higher the
freedom of choice. Thus if one individual below the threshold improves her
situation and move above z, then the value of her FCRF cannot decrease. The
TC axiom is stronger postulating that keeping the individual j performance
fixed her FCRF cannot decrease also if someone else functioning achievement
crosses the threshold. The idea is that the higher the number of individuals
experiencing functioning levels exceeding threshold z the lower should be the
eﬀort we infer is required to individuals in the group qualified by the same
characteristics in order to reach performance z.5
Our first result will provide the general class of FCRF based on some core
axioms.
Lemma 1 A FCRF satisfies A, WMA, SRI and RI if and only if
(i) either there exist function v : NH → R+, and φ : nNH → R++ such that
w(bi;b) = v(bi) · φ(b) (2)
for all bi ∈ NH ,b ∈ Bn(bi), n ≥ 1, where v(.) is non-decreasing, φ(.) is sym-
metric, replication invariant, and non-decreasing in each argument.
(ii) or w(bi;b) = 0 for all b ∈ B(bi).
We now move to derive refinements of the result in the previous that further
specify the functional for of φ. All next results hold for H ≥ 3, if the analysis is
restricted to binary functioning realizations then most of the property adopted
will turn out to be redundant, see for instance Remark 2.
Proposition 1 A FCRF satisfies A, WMA, SRI, RI and MR, N if and only if
(i) either there exist function v : NH → R+, and ψ : NH → R++ such that
w(bi;b) = v(bi) · ψ(bmax) (3)
5We can think of numbers (or proportions) of men and women occupying seats in the
National Parliaments: in recent past (and still in most countries) the possibility to obtain
seat in the Parliament was much more diﬃcult for women than for men. This discrimination
produced a numerical gap between sexes that can be used as an informative signal for our
purposes.
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for all bi ∈ NH ,b ∈ Bn(bi), n ≥ 1, where v is non-decreasing, ψ is non-
decreasing, where v(H) = 1/ψ(H), and v(1) = 0.
(ii) or w(bi;b) = 0 for all b ∈ B(bi).
Function w(bi;b) allows to refine the value of observed achieved functioning
by a function ψ(bmax), which takes note of the freedom of choice within a group
of homogeneous individuals. Proposition 1 suggests that the value of freedom
of choice positively depends on the maximal level of functioning observed in a
homogeneous group.
Considering the result of Lemma 1, axiom MR requires that φ(b0) ≥ φ(b)
if b0 = b ∪ b∗ and b∗ > bmax, otherwise φ(b0) = φ(b) if b∗ ≤ bmax. Clearly the
impact of axiom MR is mainly to reduce the admissible information in order to
operationalize the idea of “wider” set of opportunities focussing attention only
on maximal attainments in terms of functioning within the set of homogeneous
individuals.
Remark 1 The FCRF in (3) satisfies IEF.
Remark 2 If H = 2 the FCRF in (3) requires that: w(1; 1) = 0, w(1; 2) = 0,
w(2; 2) = 1. The result can be obtained making use of A, SRI and N.
In order to state next proposition we need to introduce a transformation of
the vector of achievements, let b ∈ B, and z ∈ NH then α(b, z) denotes the
vector of elements αi(b, z) obtained such that
αi(b, z) =
½
bi
z
if bi > z
if bi ≤ z
. (4)
That is all functionings in b that are not-higher than z are replaced by the value
z.
While αT (b, z) denotes the vector obtained from α(b, z) truncating all el-
ements of value z. Note that if all elements α(b, z) are of value z (i.e. all
functionings in b are not-higher than z) then αT (b, z) does not exist, to take
into account this event we make use of the following transformation of αT (b, z) :
αT∗(b, z) =
½
αT (b, z)
z
if αT (b, z) exists
otherwise
. (5)
Proposition 2 Let z ∈ NH . A FCRF satisfies A, WMA, SRI, RI, WM and
TR, N if and only if
(i) either there exist function v : NH → R+, and ζ : B→ R++ such that
w(bi;b) = v(bi) · ζ(αT∗(b, z)) (6)
for all β ∈ NH ,b ∈ Bn(β), n ≥ 1, with αT∗(b, z) derived in (5), where v is
non-decreasing, v(H) = 1/ζ(H),and v(1) = 0; and ζ is symmetric, replication
invariant, and non-decreasing.
(ii) or w(bi;b) = 0 for all b ∈ B(bi).
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Proposition 2 suggests that the value of freedom of choice positively de-
pends on the existence of individuals exceeding a chosen threshold within a
homogeneous group. It is possible to refine the value of observed achievement
by combining the evaluation function v(bi) and a function ζ(αT∗(b, z)) which
incorporates an information on freedom of choice.
Remark 3 There exist FCRFs specified in (6) that do not satisfy IEF.
Next proposition characterizes families of FCRFs where the group oppor-
tunity component is based on the evaluation of the proportion of individuals
whose functioning is above a given threshold. That is denoting by Fb(β) the
value of the distribution function of vector b evaluated at functioning β, the
obtained evaluation will be expressed in term of the associated survival func-
tion F¯b(β) := Fb(β) evaluated at some threshold level z, i.e. F¯b(z). Note that
F¯b ∈ Z[0,1] where Z[0,1] denotes the set of rational number between 0 and 1.
Proposition 3 Let z ∈ NH . A FCRF satisfies A, WMA, SRI, RI, N and TC
if and only if
(i) either there exist function v : NH → R+, and χ : NH × Z[0,1] → R++
such that
w(bi;b) = v(bi) · χ(z, F¯b(z)) (7)
for all bi ∈ NH ,b ∈ Bn(bi), n ≥ 1, where v is non-decreasing, χ is non-
decreasing, v(1) = 0 and v(H) = 1/χ(z, 1) if z < H or v(H) = 1/χ(H, 0) if
z = H.
(ii) or w(bi;b) = 0 for all b ∈ B(bi).
Proposition 3 claims that the value of freedom of choice positively depends
on the proportion of individuals exceeding a functioning target within a ho-
mogeneous group. Function w(.) refines the value of observed achievement by
combining the evaluation function v(bi) and a function χ(z, F¯b(z)) which incor-
porates the information on freedom of choice.
Remark 4 There exist FCRFs specified in (7) that do not satisfy IEF.
We now move to consider the combined eﬀect of the axioms applied in pre-
vious propositions. We will omit straightforward proofs.
Next result combines the eﬀect of MR with TR. As a result the group eval-
uation should depend on α(b, z)max, that is any increase in the maximum level
of groups functionings below a threshold z ∈ NH does not improve groups
opportunities. only once the maximum level of functionings experienced in a
group is above the threshold it counts in identifying a potential improvement in
opportunities.
13
Corollary 1 Let z ∈ NH . A FCRF satisfies A, WMA, SRI, RI, N, MR and
TR if and only if
(i) either there exist function v : NH → R+, and ψ : NH → R++ such that
w(bi;b) = v(bi) · ψ(α(b, z)max) (8)
for all bi ∈ NH ,b ∈ Bn(bi), n ≥ 1, where v is non-decreasing, ψ is increasing,
where v(H) = 1/ψ(H), and v(1) = 0.
(ii) or w(bi;b) = 0 for all b ∈ B(bi).
Next result identifies the combined eﬀect of TC and TR. In order to derive
the result we need to define an indicator function I(b, z) that reaches value 1
when at least an element of b is above z, while is 0 when all the elements of b
are not above z :
I(b, z) =
½
1
0
if F¯b(z) > 0
if F¯b(z) = 0
. (9)
The “freedom of choice” component for the rule we characterize will be
sensitive only to the existence within the group of individual functioning levels
above the threshold z. The value of the functionings above z and the proportion
of individuals experiencing them will not play any role. In intuitive terms, the
individual functioning valuation v will be scaled by a coeﬃcient that respond
positively to the fact that within the group at least some individuals have been
able to achieve a functioning realization above the threshold. The value of the
coeﬃcient may also depend on the value of the threshold considered.
Corollary 2 Let z ∈ NH . A FCRF satisfies A, WMA, SRI, RI, N, TR,and
TC if and only if
(i) either there exist function v : NH → R+, and ξ : NH × {0, 1} → R++
such that
w(bi;b) = v(bi) · ξ(z, I(b, z)) (10)
for all bi ∈ NH ,b ∈ Bn(bi), n ≥ 1, where v is non-decreasing, ξ is non-
decreasing, v(1) = 0 and v(H) = 1/ξ(z, 1) if z < H or v(H) = 1/ξ(H, 0) if
z = H.
(ii) or w(bi;b) = 0 for all b ∈ B(bi).
The combined eﬀect of all properties can be summarized in the following
straightforward remark.
Remark 5 The FCRFs in (10) satisfies MR and IEF.
As a result the specification in Corollary 2 satisfies all the axioms listed
above.
Inspection of the proof of Remark 4 can lead to the conclusion that
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Remark 6 The FCRFs specified in (7) satisfy IEF if and only if they are re-
stricted to take the specifications in Corollary 2.
While if we focus on the FCRFs specified in (6) then it is possible to identify
a variety of functional forms for ζ(αT∗(b, z)) that allow to satisfy IEF. For
instance this is the case for all increasing functions of the maximum or of the
minimum value of αT∗(b, z). Note that this may not the case [as shown in the
proof of Remark 3] if we consider increasing functions of some average of max
and min of αT∗.
These last remarks show a theoretical point in favor of the results in Propo-
sition 1 and Corollary 2 as plausible and attractive specifications for the FCRFs.
The independence condition (IEF) we have assumed is really weak, since it re-
quires to check consistency in across groups evaluations made concerning an
individual with the same functioning performance. In essence the “freedom of
choice” component eﬀect cannot lead to re-rank of two groups prospects if the
same functioning level is added to each group. The maximal rule focussing on
the maximal functioning realization in a group seems a natural candidate for a
specification of the FCRFs in Lemma 1 satisfying IEF. If the notion of thresh-
old is also introduced then the indicator rule in Corollary 2 focussing on the
existence of realizations above the threshold is a solution that also show the
advantage of satisfying all the other axioms considered. Some intermediate rule
in between those in Proposition 1 and Corollary 2 and still satisfying IEF can
be conceived. For instance relying on the result in Proposition 2 it seems rea-
sonable to suggest a censored maximal rule where diﬀerences in maximal values
are relevant to assess the “freedom of choice” component only if these values
are above a threshold or alternatively if they are all below the threshold.
3.1.1 Aggregate evaluations
A useful feature of all FCRFs rule in Lemma 1 is that they explicitly separate
(in a multiplicative manner) the individual functioning valuation and the group
valuation representing the freedom of choice component. As a result of this
feature all aggregate population evaluations obtained averaging the individuals
FCRFs are also separable in each group average of the individual functioning
valuation.
For instance, considering K subgroups indexed by k = 1, 2, ..,K, denoting
by bki the functioning of individual i belonging to group k, and by b
k the group
distribution of the nk individuals in group k, letting n the size of the whole
population, if we apply the FCRFs rule w(bi;b) = v(bki )·φ(bk) derived in Lemma
1 we can formalize the aggregate functioning valuation adjusted in order to take
into account the “freedom of choice” component as Wφ(b) = 1n
Pn
i=1w(bi;b) =
1
n
Pn
i=1 v(b
k
i ) · φ(bk). More precisely we have
Wφ(b) =
XK
k=1
µ
nk
n
¶
· φ(bk) · 1
nk
Xnk
i=1
v(bki ) (11)
=
XK
k=1
µ
nk
n
¶
· φ(bk) · V (bk)
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where V (bk) = 1
nk
Pnk
i=1 v(b
k
i ) denotes the average functioning valuation in
group k.
The final formula in (11) is a weighted average of the V (bk) components
where each group average individual functioning valuation is weighted according
to the group “freedom of choice” coeﬃcient given by φ(bk) times the population
share of the group nk/n measuring the relevance of the group over the entire
population.
Adapting the formula in (11) to the specifications of the FCRF in Proposition
1, Corollary 2 and Proposition 3 is simply a matter of adopting the relevant
specification for the function φ. For each one of the mentioned specification we
obtain, respectively:
Wψ(b) =
XK
k=1
µ
nk
n
¶
· ψ(bkmax) · V (bk)
Wξ(b) =
XK
k=1
µ
nk
n
¶
· ξ(z, I(bk, z)) · V (bk)
Wχ(b) =
XK
k=1
µ
nk
n
¶
· χ(z, F¯bk(z)) · V (bk).
4 Comparing diﬀerent criteria
We compare the three diﬀerent criteria proposed in Section 3.1 to evaluate re-
fined functionings. Consider figure 1 where the cumulative distributions {FA, FB}
of individual functioning achievements for groups A and B are represented. Note
that distribution A first order stochastically dominates distribution B since
FA ≤ FB for all values of b. As is well known, for distributions of the same
population size, this dominance is equivalent to the fact that distribution A can
be obtained from B increasing the functioning realization of some individuals
without aﬀecting the achievement of the others. Clearly in terms of “freedom
of choice” distribution A cannot lead to a lower evaluation than distribution B.
The criterion related to maximal rule (see Proposition 1) is sensitive to
the evaluation of the horizontal gap between the maximal value observed in
group A (bmaxA ), and the maximal value observed in group B (b
max
B ). The main
advantage of this first criterion is that it is easy to understand and persuasive:
a group of individuals showing a lower maximal functioning level compared to
other groups, produces an objective limitation in terms of freedom of choice for
individuals within the group, compared to the other group. The disadvantage of
the criterion is that it concentrates solely on the upper point of the distribution
without taking into account the rest of distribution as for instance is done by the
first order stochastic dominance condition. In fact it may happen that most of
individuals within a group show adequate levels of functioning, but none reaches
the ultimately satisfactory level, while agents belonging to another group are
located at the bottom of the achievement levels with few individuals showing
extremely high performances. Also, in many empirical applications it happens
that at least one individual in all compared groups reaches the same maximal
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level of functioning: in this case the maximal rule becomes ineﬀective. Moreover
it is not able to discriminate between distributions where only few “lucky”
individuals reach the top, compared to others where the maximal functioning
achievement is a common feature of the population.
 
FB  
FA  
FA(z) = FB(z) 
1 
F(b) 
b bB
max bAmax z 
FA  FB  
Fig. 1: Graphical representation of diﬀerent criteria to evaluate FCRF
The criterion associated with the threshold rule (see Corollary 2) is similar
to that related with the maximal rule: the main diﬀerence is that we consider a
threshold not necessarily identical to the maximal observed value. Moreover we
focus only on the information concerning the achievement of the threshold. In
common with the maximal rule is the criticism that the threshold rule does not
take into account neither how many people are above the threshold nor their
distributions of the achieved functioning.
The criterion associated with the threshold consistence rule (see Proposition
2) on the other hand considers explicitly the proportion of population who ex-
ceeds a given threshold in terms of functioning. In figure 1, the distance in
terms of “freedom of choice” between the two groups relates to the vertical gap
between distribution of group A (FA(z)) and distribution of group B (FB(z))
given the chosen threshold. The main advantage of this criterion is that it em-
bodies a diﬀerent useful information about the distribution of diﬀerent groups in
terms of the functioning achievement. The disadvantage is that it is less obvious
to understand in terms of capability: it is hard to think that the performance
of two persons belonging to diﬀerent groups must be valued diﬀerently, even
when they achieve the same level of functioning and the groups show the same
maximal functioning level.
To conclude all the criteria presented make use of useful and meaningful
information, by their nature they focus on some specific features of the dis-
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tribution of functionings. As the maximal rule turns out to be problematic
because of it focuses only on maximal values forgetting the information on both
all the other part of the distribution and the proportion of individuals at the
maximum, the threshold consistence rule is concerned only on the proportion
of population above a specified threshold, still disregarding the information on
all the other part of the distribution. For expositional purpose in the figure we
have depicted a situation where in terms of the threshold consistence rule the
group performance is the same while the maximal rule favors distribution A,
the graphs can be readjusted in order to show the opposite. Most importantly
they can provide conflicting answers when applied to compare two distributions
that are not ranked in term of first order stochastic dominance.
4.1 Examples
Consider the following case: suppose the population is partitioned into four
subgroups (k = 1, 2, 3, 4) according to characteristic "class of age". We focus
on the functioning “health condition” whose individual realizations are ordered
into qualitative classes. We will evaluate individuals health condition using
the FCRF function w(bi;b) = v(bi) ·φ(b) derived in Lemma 1 and consider the
implications related to the various specifications of φ(b) obtained in the previous
sections. The functioning is evaluated by an ordinal indicator, taking values
running from 1 to 6, where 1 means “very bad health condition” and 6 stands
for “excellent health condition”. We have four individuals i ∈ {A,B,C,D} each
one belonging respectively to subgroup 1,2,3 and 4.
The choosing sets are defined as follow:
b1 = {2, 3, 3, 3, 4} ,b2 = {1, 2, 4} ,b3 = {1, 3, 4, 4, 4, 5} ,b4 = {1, 2, 4, 6} (12)
where bA = 3 ∈ b1, bB = 4 ∈ b2, bC = 5 ∈ b3, and bD = 4 ∈ b4.
We compare the diﬀerent criteria derived in Proposition 1, Corollary 2 and
Proposition 3 in order highlight interesting features of their behavior and explain
how they operationalize the notion of FCRF.
(1 ) First, we consider the maximal rule: w(bi;b) = v(bi) ·ψk(bmax) derived
in Proposition 1,
For expositional purposes we suggest an aﬃne specification for the function
v(bi) representing the individual functioning valuation and normalize its value
such that v(1) = 0 and v(H) = v(6) = 1. Similarly we suggest an aﬃne specifi-
cation also for ψ(bmax) and require that the normalization conditions specified
in Proposition 1 hold. In practice we let v(bi) = α + β · bi where β ≥ 0, and
such that v(1) = α+ β = 0 and v(H) = v(6) = α+ β ·H = α+ β · 6 = 1. As a
result we obtain the following specification of function v :
v(bi) =
bi − 1
H − 1 . (13)
While for function ψ we have ψ(bmax) = γ + δ · bmax where δ ≥ 0, and ψ =
γ + δ · bmax > 0. Applying the normalization condition in Proposition 1 we get
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ψ(H) = γ + δ · H = 1, thus δ = (1 − γ)/H, which also implies that ψ > 0 if
γ + (1 − γ)/H > 0 i.e. γ > −1/(H − 1). For large values of H the condition
γ > −1/(H − 1) can be approximated by γ ≥ 0. That is we have
ψγ(b
max) := γ + (1− γ) · b
max
H
, γ ∈ [0, 1] . (14)
The final parametric specification obtained for w is
wγ(bi;b) =
bi − 1
H − 1 · [γ + (1− γ) ·
bmax
H
] = γ · bi − 1
H − 1 + (1− γ) ·
bi − 1
H − 1 ·
bmax
H
(15)
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
Thus for γ = 1 we obtain only the individual functioning valuation, while
on the other extreme for γ = 0 we get the FCRF w0(bi;b) = bi−1H−1 · b
max
H where
the individual valuation is weighted by the relative maximal performance of the
group in terms of functioning level b
max
H .
We consider (12) and derive the pattern of ranking for the 4 individuals
depending on the value of γ. For this purpose we first compute w0(bi;b) =
bi−1
H−1 · b
max
H i.e. the refined functioning of the individuals evaluated for γ = 0
(see tab. 1). The ranking of the individuals will be obtained by comparing the
values of wi0 := w0(bi;b).
Tab 1: An application of the Maximal Rule, with ψ(bmax) = b
max
H
Individual
v(bi)
= bi−1H−1
ψ(bmax)
= b
max
H
w0(bi;b)
= bi−1H−1 · b
max
H
A 2/5 4/6 2 · 4/30 = 8/30
B 3/5 4/6 3 · 4/30 = 12/30
C 4/5 5/6 4 · 5/30 = 20/30
D 3/5 6/6 3 · 6/30 = 18/30
wA0 < w
B
0 < w
D
0 < w
C
0 .
The general result valid for wγ(bi;b) can be obtained checking that the ranking
associated with w1(bi;b) = v(bi) is wA1 < w
B
1 = w
D
1 < w
C
1 .
Thus a convex combination of w1(bi;b) and w0(bi;b) as in (15) will lead to
wAγ < w
B
γ < w
D
γ < w
C
γ for all γ ∈ [0, 1), and
wA1 < w
B
1 = w
D
1 < w
C
1 .
(2 ) Next, we consider the Threshold Rule derived in Corollary 2: wˆ(z, bi;b) =
v(bi) · ξ(z, I(b, z)) where I(b, z) is an indicator function reaching value 1 when
at least an element of b is above the threshold z, while I(b, z) is 0 when all the
elements of b are not above z.
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We set v(bi) as in (13), and set z = 4 the chosen threshold, identical for all
subgroups. Moreover, inspired by part (1) of the example we set a parametric
specification ξρ of ξ(z, I(b, z)) as an aﬃne function i.e.
ξρ(z, I(b, z)) =
½
1
ρ
if F¯b(z) > 0
if F¯b(z) = 0
= ρ+ (1− ρ) · I(b, z), (16)
where ρ ∈ [0, 1] and F¯b(z) denotes the survival function of distribution b eval-
uated at z.
Note that for ρ = 1 all groups component receive the same evaluation equal
to 1, while for ρ = 0 we get the maximal discrimination between groups de-
pending on the existence of individuals experiencing functioning level above the
threshold z. Thus we obtain
wˆρ(z, bi;b) =
bi − 1
H − 1 · [ρ+ (1− ρ) · I(b, z)] = ρ ·
bi − 1
H − 1 + (1− ρ) ·
bi − 1
H − 1 · I(b, z).
(17)
We derive the pattern of ranking of the 4 individuals depending on the value of
ρ first computing wˆ0(z, bi;b) = bi−1H−1 · I(b, z) (see Tab. 2).
Tab 2: An application of the Threshold Rule, with ξ(z, I(b, z)) = I(b, z)
with z = 4.
Individual
v(bi)
= bi−1H−1
ξ0(4, I(b, 4))
= I(b, 4)
wˆ0(4, bi;b)
= bi−1H−1 · I(b, 4)
A 2/5 0 2/5 · 0 = 0
B 3/5 0 3/5 · 0 = 0
C 4/5 1 4/5 · 1 = 4/5
D 3/5 1 3/5 · 1 = 3/5
wˆA0 = wˆ
B
0 < wˆ
D
0 < wˆ
C
0
When z = 4, the general result valid for wˆρ(bi;b) can be obtained checking
that the ranking associated with wˆ1(bi;b) = v(bi) is wˆA1 < wˆ
B
1 = wˆ
D
1 < wˆ
C
1 .
Thus a convex combination of wˆ1(bi;b) and wˆ0(bi;b) as in (17) will lead to
wˆAρ < wˆ
B
ρ < wˆ
D
ρ < wˆ
C
ρ for all ρ ∈ (0, 1),
wˆA0 = wˆ
B
0 < wˆ
D
0 < wˆ
C
0 , and
wˆA1 < wˆ
B
1 = wˆ
D
1 < wˆ
C
1 .
Note that for any value of z < 4 there exist in any group at least one
individual above the threshold, as a result I(bk, z) = 1 for any k = 1, 2, 3, 4 and
any z = 1, 2, 3, thereby implying that for any z = 1, 2, 3 we have wˆρ(z, bi;b) =
wˆ1(z, bi;b) = v(bi) for all ρ ∈ [0, 1]. While setting z = 5 will allow only to
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individual D to benefit from the higher value of the group component while all
the other individuals will experience a value 0 for the indicator function I(bk, z).
(3 ) Finally, we consider the third criterion, the Threshold Consistent Rule
derived in Proposition 3: w¯(z, bi;b) = v(bi) · χ(z, F¯b(z)).
We set v(bi) as in (13) and define a parametric specification χλ of χ(z, F¯b(z))
as an aﬃne function of F¯b(z) normalized according to the prescriptions specified
in Proposition 3. As a result of this procedure we obtain
χλ(z, F¯b(z)) = λ+ (1− λ) · F¯b(z) (18)
where λ ∈ [0, 1] . Note that for λ = 1 all group components receive the same
evaluation equal to 1, while for λ = 0 the group component of the FCRF is
given by the group survival function evaluated at z.
Thus we get
w¯λ(z, bi;b) =
bi − 1
H − 1 · [λ+ (1− λ) · F¯b(z)] = λ ·
bi − 1
H − 1 + (1− λ) ·
bi − 1
H − 1 · F¯b(z).
(19)
Analogously to what done in the previous examples we evaluate w¯0(z, bi;b) =
bi−1
H−1 · F¯b(z). Letting z = 2 we obtain:
Tab 3: An application of the Threshold Consistent Rule, with χ0(z, F¯b(z)) =
F¯b(z) with z = 2.
Individual
v(bi)
= bi−1H−1
χ0(2, F¯b(z))
= F¯b(2)
w¯0(2, bi;b)
= bi−1H−1 · F¯b(2)
A 2/5 4/5 8/25 = 0.32
B 3/5 1/3 1/5 = 0.2
C 4/5 5/6 2/3 = 0.66¯
D 3/5 2/4 3/10 = 0.3
w¯B0 < w¯
D
0 < w¯
A
0 < w¯
C
0
The ranking of w¯i0 shows an improvement of agent A, even if her individual
functioning valuation is the lower (vA = 0.4) the refined functioning takes it
almost completely into account (w¯A0 = 0.32) since 80% of individuals in group
A are above the threshold. The general result valid for w¯λ(bi;b) can be obtained
evaluating the convex combinations of w1(bi;b) = v(bi) and w0(bi;b) as in (18).
Noting that the ranking of w¯i1 is w¯
A
1 < w¯
B
1 = w¯
D
1 < w¯
C
1 it is clear that the final
ranking of w¯λ(bi;b) will depend on the values of λ.
We obtain w¯B0 < w¯
D
0 < w¯
C
0 and w¯
A
0 < w¯
C
0 for all λ ∈ [0, 1), while w¯B0 < w¯A0
for λ ∈ [0, 3/8) and w¯D0 < w¯A0 for λ ∈ [0, 1/11).
If instead we set z = 4, as in part 2 of the example, we get
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Tab 4: An application of the Threshold Consistent Rule, with χ0(z, F¯b(z)) =
F¯b(z) with z = 4.
Individual
v(bi)
= bi−1H−1
χ0(4, F¯b(z))
= F¯b(4)
w¯0(4, bi;b)
= bi−1H−1 · F¯b(4)
A 2/5 0 0
B 3/5 0 0
C 4/5 1/6 4/30 = 0.13¯
D 3/5 1/4 3/20 = 0.15
w¯B0 = w¯
A
0 < w¯
C
0 < w¯
D
0
It is clear that the ranking in terms of w¯iλ will show individual D at the top
only for low values of λ while in all other cases, it will place individual D above
B and below C.
To summarize: In the example we obtain diﬀerent rankings, according to
diﬀerent criteria applied. The result is not surprising since by construction
among all 6 pairwise comparisons of the distributions bk it is possible to identify
a first order stochastic dominance relation between b4 and b2 and b3 and b2,
for all other comparisons the stochastic dominance test fails. Given that the
associated individual functioning values are bB = 4 ∈ b2 ≤ bD = 4 ∈ b4 < bC =
5 ∈ b3 then no matter what is the criterion applied we will always obtain that
in terms of FCRFs wB ≤ wC and wB ≤ wD.
For all other pairwise comparisons if the threshold consistent rule then (i)
the choice of the threshold plays a fundamental role given that when two dis-
tributions cannot be ranked in terms of stochastic dominance then the ranking
of their survival functions F¯b(z) depends on the value of z.
(ii) While the first two criteria focus on a target value and discriminate in
a net way in terms of freedom of choice, the last (threshold consistent) rule is
related to the distribution of individuals in each group but limits attention only
at those above z.
Moreover, (iii) the choice of the refinement function φ(b) plays obviously a
role. In the final section we will introduce some further assumptions in order to
restrict the set of possible candidates for the functional forms of the “freedom
of choice component”.
5 Empirical analysis
The straightforward empirical application of the methodology described above
is based on data from the micro-survey “Multiscopo” provided by Istat for the
year 2002. This survey has not been designed ad hoc to assess well-being in the
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capability space: however, the analysis of data persuaded us that, despite the
strong limitation in terms of variables, it can represent an adequate source of
information to develop a battery of indicators and apply the refinement criteria.
The survey is composed of more than 50.000 individuals.
The empirical analysis aims at clarifying some features of the procedures
suggested in the previous sections. It concentrates on the functioning “adequate
cultural level” of individuals older than 14 years. The functioning can be eval-
uated by using two ordinal indicators: an index of literacy and an indicator on
the use of personal computer. The index of literacy is an ordinal variable which
ranks from 1 (illiteracy) to 6 (university degree or more). The distribution of
individuals according to this indicator is described in the following table 5:
Tab. 5: Literacy levels: distribution of population and gender-based distri-
bution, (source: Istat survey “Multiscopo”, 2002).
Literacy level I1i freq.
freq.
Male
freq.
Female
Illiteracy 1 5, 6% 3, 5% 7, 6%
Primary school 2 22, 4% 19, 7% 25, 0%
Secondary school 3 32, 4% 35, 6% 29, 4%
3-years high school 4 5, 3% 5, 7% 5, 0%
5-years high school 5 26, 4% 27, 3% 25, 7%
university degree 6 7, 8% 8, 3% 7, 3%
About half of individuals aged 14 or more show a level of literacy equal to
secondary school or lower: only 7,8 per cent of Italian population reaches a
degree level. Some diﬀerences exists between men and women: the distribution
of men clearly dominates (in terms of first order stochastic dominance) that of
women in terms of literacy (data show that this is especially true among adult
and old individuals).
PC clearly represents a powerful means of communication and transmission
of culture, especially because it allows to access the web. The index on the use
of PC reported in the Istat survey is an ordinal variable which ranks from 1 (use
everyday) to 6 (use never): we can readjust it ranking performances in opposite
order increasing in the use of PC. Table 6 shows the distribution of individuals
according to this indicator.
Tab. 6: Use of PC: distribution of population and gender-based distribu-
tion, (source: Istat survey “Multiscopo”, 2002).
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Use of PC I2i freq.
freq.
Male
freq.
Female
Never 1 63, 2% 56, 9% 69, 0%
Sometimes during the year 2 1, 5% 1, 4% 1, 6%
Sometimes every month 3 2, 7% 2, 4% 3, 0%
Once a week 4 1, 0% 1, 0% 1, 0%
Sometimes during the week 5 10, 8% 12, 0% 9, 6%
Every day 6 20, 8% 26, 3% 15, 8%
In 2002 the large part of Italian citizens (14 years old or more) still don’t use
personal computer: only one fifth of population uses PC every day. Moreover,
large diﬀerences exist at the top of distribution between men and women: only
15,8 per cent of women switches on the PC every day, compared with 26,3 per
cent of men. This is partly associated with the gender-based diﬀerences in the
structure of Italian job market and the fact that most people use the PC as a
every-day working tool. Note that also for this variable the “male distribution”
first order stochastically dominates the “female distribution”.
In order to arrive to the objective evaluation function v(bi) of functioning
adequate cultural level we proceed by two steps: first we evaluate the mean
value of the two indices for each individual, arriving to the functioning level
bi. Then we choose a function, linear in the level of achieved functioning: we
can choose a straightforward normalization v(bi) = (bi − 1)/(H − 1) as in (12).
Our procedure assumes that the two indicators have the same relevance in the
evaluation of functioning adequate cultural level.
Tab. 7: Functioning adequate cultural level. Distribution of population and
gender-based distribution, (source: Istat survey ”Multiscopo”, 2002).
Functioning level
bi
= I1i+I2i2
freq.
freq.
Male
freq.
Female
Very bad 1 5,5% 3,5% 7,5%
bad 1,5 21,8% 18,7% 24,7%
bad-inadequate 2 21,8% 22,4% 21,2%
Inadequate 2,5 3,8% 3,9% 3,7%
suﬃcient 3 10,5% 9,2% 11,8%
Discrete 3,5 3,2% 3,1% 3,4%
Discrete-Good 4 5,7% 3,2% 5,2%
Good 4,5 5,9% 7,6% 4,3%
Very good 5 5,6% 5,9% 5,4%
Excellent 5,5 12,0% 14,5% 9,7%
Maximal 6 4,2% 5,2% 3,2%
v(bi)
= bi−1H−1
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1
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Now we try to apply the criteria presented in Section 3.1, in order to arrive to
a refined functioning of adequate cultural level, which takes note of an element of
freedom of choice. We choose the gender as a relevant characteristic of freedom
of choice: the aim is to test whether the belonging to a given gender-based
group creates a discrimination in terms of freedom of choice. Note that also for
the obtained distribution of the “averaged” functioning the “male distribution”
first order stochastically dominates the “female distribution”, recall that the
dominance checked for the distributions of the two functionings I1 and I2 is not
in general a suﬃcient condition for dominance in terms of their average.
We choose two representative individuals, which we call A and B.
A is a male, he is 30 and shows a level of v(bi) = 0, 5; B is a female, she is
30 and shows the same level of v(bi) = 0, 5. In terms of functioning level, A and
B show the same result: however, as we can see in table 5 and 6, there exists
a clear diﬀerence in the distribution of men and women in terms of achieved
functioning. Our aim is to incorporate this diﬀerence in terms of opportunity,
directly associated with the sex of individual, to the situation of individuals A
and B.
Tab. 8: Evaluation of the level of functioning adequate cultural level. Rep-
resentative individuals A and B (source: Istat survey ”Multiscopo”, 2002).
Individual I1i I2i bi = I1i+I2i2 v(bi) =
bi−1
H−1
A 4 3 bA = 3, 5 0, 5
B 3 4 bB = 3, 5 0, 5
First of all we apply the maximal rule. Let w(bi;b) = v(bi) · bmax/H be the
freedom-of-choice based refinement function, which represents the most naïve
case (already presented in the previous example: we weight the value of in-
dividual functioning v(bi) by multiplying it by bmax/H, which represents the
maximum bi observed in the subgroup normalized by its maximum feasible level
H.
Tab 9: Application of the maximal rule (MR) with ψ(bmax) = bmax/H.
Representative individuals A and B (source: Istat survey ”Multiscopo”, 2002).
Individual v(bi) bmax w(bi;b) = bi−1H−1 · b
max
H
A 0, 5 bmaxmale = 6 0, 5 · 6/6 = 0, 5
B 0, 5 bmaxfemale = 6 0, 5 · 6/6 = 0, 5
As we can notice, in both gender-based groups there exist at least one in-
dividual who shows the functioning level “6”: the maximal rule thus becomes
ineﬀective in discriminating between the performances of individual A and B in
terms of FCRFs.
If we apply the threshold rule, when the FCRF is defined as in (17) and
choose the threshold z = 5, identical for all subgroup, we obtain:
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Tab 10: Application of the threshold rule (TR). Representative individuals
A and B (source: Istat survey ”Multiscopo”, 2002).
Individual v(bi) I(b, 5) wˆ0(5, bi;b) = bi−1H−1 · I(b, 4)
A 0, 5 1 0, 5 · 1 = 0, 5
B 0, 5 1 0, 5 · 1 = 0, 5
The threshold rule seems ineﬀective too: there exists at least one individual
exceeding the threshold in both groups, no matter what is the level of z. The
main reason for this result is associated with the fact that we are dealing with a
large sample of representative individuals living in a country, and also probably
because the suggested partition of the population is not suﬃciently informative
given the procedure we adopt.
Finally we apply the threshold consistent rule, setting the FCRF as defined
in (18) and choose the threshold z = 5, identical for all subgroup.
Tab 11: An application of the threshold consistence (TC). Representative
individuals A and B (source: Istat survey ”Multiscopo”, 2002).
Individual v(bi) F¯b(z) w(bi; b) = v(bi) · F¯b(z)
A 0, 5 19.7% 0, 5 · 0, 197 = 0, 099
B 0, 5 12.9% 0, 5 · 0, 151 = 0, 065
In this last case we have a re-ranking: individual B belongs to the group of
women that is strictly dominated by the group of men in terms of the freedom
of choice component. Thus, the refined functioning of B must be weighted in
order to take into account the higher eﬀort required to women reach the same
level of living standard.
It might be of interest to replicate the previous comparisons analyzing the
eﬀects deriving from further partitions of the groups. If also age is perceived to
have an impact on identifying individuals capability sets in the space of cultural
achievements then it might be appropriate to consider a further partition of the
classes of males and female based on age. We consider three classes: individuals
aged 18 and less, those aged 66 and more and the intermediate age class19-65.
The distribution of the functioning for males and females is presented in the
next two tables. From them it is possible to realize that it is not possible to
rank all pairwise comparisons of groups in terms of stochastic dominance. In
general middle age classes stochastically dominate older classes of the same sex
while the younger class cannot be ranked if compared to the other two. The
reason for this pattern is probably due to the obvious constraint imposed on
the younger class that by definition cannot reach the higher educational levels.
It seems that age plays a role in defining the opportunity sets in terms of the
crude variable we have used to evaluate cultural achievements. Also sex plays
a role since fixing the same class of age the “male distribution” stochastically
dominates the “female distribution” for each class.
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Tab. 12: Functioning adequate cultural level. Distribution based on class
of age, male. (source: Istat survey “Multiscopo”, 2002).
Functioning level
v(bi)
= bi−1H−1
freq.
≤ 18
freq.
19− 65
freq.
≥ 66
Very bad 0 - 1,3% 14,5%
bad 0,1 2,0% 12,7% 51,7%
bad-inadequate 0,2 15,7% 24,4% 15,1%
Inadequate 0,3 1,1% 4,3% 2,7%
suﬃcient 0,4 4,5% 9,8% 8,1%
Discrete 0,5 5,1% 2,7% 4,3%
Discrete-Good 0,6 35,4% 5,4% 0,7%
Good 0,7 35,2% 7,2% 0,5%
Very good 0,8 0,9 7,4% 0,5%
Excellent 0,9 0,1 18,3% 1,4%
Maximal 1 - 6,5% 0,6%
Tab. 13: Functioning adequate cultural level. Distribution based on class
of age, female. (source: Istat survey “Multiscopo”, 2002).
Functioning level
v(bi)
= bi−1H−1
freq.
≤ 18
freq.
19− 65
freq.
≥ 66
Very bad 0 0,1% 2,2% 26,1%
bad 0,1 1,9% 17,6% 52,4%
bad-inadequate 0,2 20,9% 24,6% 10,2%
Inadequate 0,3 2,7% 4,3% 1,8%
suﬃcient 0,4 7,5% 13,4% 7,1%
Discrete 0,5 5,9% 3,7% 1,9%
Discrete-Good 0,6 38,8% 4,7% 0,2%
Good 0,7 21,9% 4,5% 0,1%
Very good 0,8 0,22% 7,3% 0,1%
Excellent 0,9 - 13,3% 0,1%
Maximal 1 - 4,4% 0,1%
Next tables list the group components to use to supplement the individual
functioning valuations v in order to derive the various formulations for FCRFs.
Table 14 provides the relevant information for computing, according to the
parametric specifications derived in the previous examples, the maximal rule
w0, the threshold rule wˆ0with thresholds sets at z = 4.5 and z = 5 and the
threshold consistent rule w¯0 also with thresholds sets at z = 4.5 and z = 5.
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Tab. 14: Evaluation of the level of functioning adequate cultural level.
partition age/sex (source: Istat survey ”Multiscopo”, 2002). Some group com-
ponents.
Individual
male ≤ 18
male19− 65
male ≥ 66
female ≤ 18
female19− 65
female ≥ 66
bmax/H
0, 9
1
1
0, 8
1
1
I(5,b)
1
1
1
0
1
1
I(4.5,b)
1
1
1
1
1
1
F¯b(5)
0, 1%
24, 8%
2, 0%
0
17, 7%
0, 2%
F¯b(4.5)
1, 1%
32, 2%
2, 5%
0, 22%
25, 0%
0, 3%
Next tables make uses of the results in Tab 14 and specifies some particular
values for the group component (14), (16) and (18) respectively associated with
the parametric FCRF in (15), (17) and (19) evaluated for the parameter levels
set at 0.5.
Tab. 15: Evaluation of the level of functioning adequate cultural level.
partition age/sex (source: Istat survey ”Multiscopo”, 2002). Intermediate eval-
uations of parametric group components.
Individual
male ≤ 18
male19− 65
male ≥ 66
female ≤ 18
female19− 65
female ≥ 66
ψ0.5
0, 95
1
1
0, 9
1
1
ξ0.5[5]
1
1
1
0.5
1
1
ξ0.5[4.5]
1
1
1
1
1
1
χ0.5[5]
0, 500
0, 624
0, 510
0, 500
0, 589
0, 501
χ0.5[4.5]
0, 506
0, 661
0, 513
0, 501
0, 625
0, 503
6 Extending the analysis
As pointed out earlier in order to rank individuals in terms of FCRFs the result
associated with the characterizations obtained in Section 3.1 are clearly sensitive
to the choice of the function φ(b) evaluating the “freedom of choice component”.
In order to derive robust (i.e. independent from the functional form of
φ(b)) explicit answers to comparisons in terms of FCRF of individuals belonging
to diﬀerent groups it can be shown that it is necessary that one individual
dominates the other both in terms of individual functioning b and in terms of
group functionings distributions b. If φ(b) is specified according to the maximal
rule or the threshold rule derived in Section 3.1 then it is required that the
dominant individual belongs to a group that dominates the other in terms of
bmax, while if we adopt the threshold consistency rule in order to reach a robust
ranking it is still required stochastic dominance in terms of group functionings
distribution b.
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In order to increase the power of the comparison test next property suggests a
natural weak extension of the between group comparability hypothesis assuming
that for an individual FCRF an increase of “one step” in his functioning level
can compensate for a decrease of “one step” in the functioning achievement of
another individual belonging to the same group.
Axiom 11 ((WIP) Weak Individual Priority) Let bj , bi ∈ NH , bi > 1, bj <
H, and b ∈ Bn(bi, bj), b0 ∈ Bn(bi− 1; bj +1), s.t. b0 = b−{i,j} ∪ (bi− 1; bj +1)
then w(bi;b) ≥ w(bi − 1;b0).
The priority assumption underlying WIP may have diﬀerent eﬀects on the
implementation of between groups comparisons depending on the criteria con-
sidered. We analyse these implications for the FCRF, associated with the max-
imal rule, derived in Proposition 1 i.e. for w(bi;b) = v(bi) · ψ(bmax) where v is
non-decreasing, ψ is non-decreasing, and normalization leads to v(H) = 1/ψ(H)
and v(1) = 0. Related results can be obtained for the threshold rule, while the
threshold consistency rule may require a stronger specification of the individual
priority property.
Lemma 2 The FCRFs in (3) satisfy WIP if and only if
min
m≥b>b+1
½
v(b)
v(b− 1)
¾
≥ ψ(m+ 1)
ψ(m)
for any m ≤ H − 1 (20)
where b := max{b ∈ NH : v(b) = 0}.
The result identifies restrictions on the values of the function ψ related to the
“group component” conditional on the behavior of v related to the “individual
achievements”. Note that since v is non-decreasing then v(b)/v(b − 1) ≥ 1 for
all b > b + 1, and given that also ψ is non-decreasing, from (20) it has to be
ψ(m + 1)/ψ(m) ≥ 1 for all m ∈ {b + 1, ...,H − 1}. Therefore if there exists b
such that v(b) = v(b− 1) then ψ(m) = ψ(b) for all m ≥ b, i.e. the function ψ is
constant for all values higher than b.
The result in Lemma 2 is still too general to allow to make the criterion
operational without specifying appropriate functional forms for the functions
v and ψ. However, in some cases, once a family of functions v is identified it
is possible to derive more precise specifications also for the associated FCRFs
making use of Lemma 2 to narrow down the set of admissible ψ. This is the
case for the family v{b,b¯}(b) of “membership functions” used in empirical and
theoretical analysis [see Cerioli and Zani (1990), Brandolini and D’Alessio (2000)
and Chiappero (2000)]. The parametric family v{b,b¯}(b) is specified as
v{b,b¯}(b) =



0
b−b
b¯−b
1
if 1 ≤ b ≤ b
if b < b ≤ b¯
if b¯ < b ≤ H
(21)
where b < b¯ ∈ NH , it associates equal increments to the value of v to each
increment in the classes of individual achievements b censoring the values of the
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function above b¯ and below b. Note that the valuation function suggested in the
examples is a special case of v{b,b¯} obtained for b = 1 and b¯ = H.
Our aim is to investigate a possible test for dominance between individuals
based on (21) for fixed 1 ≤ b < b¯ ≤ H and made robust to the choice of the
admissible ψ satisfying WIP according to Lemma 2. We denote by Ψ(b, b¯) the
set of all admissible ψ consistent with v{b,b¯} as (21) according to the conditions
specified in Lemma 2.
Next result turns out to provide a clear-cut answer to our question identi-
fying a simple set of testable conditions for dominance expressed in terms of
functionings b. For this purpose we define by b[b,b¯] the value of b censored at b¯
for values above b¯ and censored at b for values below b, similarly we define by
m[z] a function where the value of is censored at z for values below z.
Proposition 4 Let b, b0 ∈ NH ,and b ∈ B(b), b0 ∈ B(b0), then
v{b,b¯}(b) · ψ(bmax) ≥ v{b,b¯}(b0) · ψ(b0max)
for all ψ ∈ Ψ(b, b¯) if and only if:
(i) b[b,b¯] ≥ b0[b,b¯] and
(ii) max {b− b; 0}·min©[bmax − 1− b][1]; b¯− bª ≥ max {b0 − b; 0}·min{[b0max−
1− b][1]; b¯− b}.
In particular if both b ≤ b0, b ≤ b¯ and 2 ≤ bmax,b0max ≤ b¯ + 1 the two
dominance conditions in the proposition can be specified as:
(i) b ≥ b0 and
(ii) (b− b) · (bmax − 1− b) ≥ (b0 − b) · (b0max − 1− b).
While condition (i) requires dominance in terms of individual functioning
condition (ii) does not necessarily require dominance in terms of maximal group
value, it is still possible that (ii) holds while bmax < b0max.
The result suggests to adopt the following a possible specification of the
maximal rule when b = 1 and b¯ = H > 2 as required in the examples in the
previous section:
w(bi;b) =
bi − 1
H − 1 ·
max{bmax − 2; 1}
H − 2 (22)
which is normalized such that w(H;H · 1) = 1.
7 Conclusion
The aim of this work is mainly a tentative to define a criterion for a more
comprehensive way to evaluate well-being, which takes into account an infor-
mation regarding individual freedom of choice. We have described the capabil-
ity approach, a powerful theoretical framework for the definition of well-being
defended by the Nobel A.K. Sen and suggested a methodology to make oper-
ationalize the notion of capability set. Once the population is partitioned into
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subgroups of homogeneous individuals then if the partition is appropriately de-
fined the variability in the space of functioning achievements can be interpreted
as being related to individual choices and not to their relevant characteristics.
As a result the group distribution will provide information on the individual
capability set.
We try to justify the choice of the capability approach as a theoretical basis
for a more comprehensive assessment of individuals’ quality of life. We pro-
vides a formal characterization of a freedom-of-choice based refinement function
(FCRF), a function capable to evaluate both individuals’ achievement and their
freedom of choice. The specification of some rules that formalize thee freedom-
of-choice based refinement function is axiomatically derived. Some examples
helped to explain how the function works and a straightforward empirical ap-
plication is presented based on a large survey provided by Istat for 2002. To
conclude we suggest a possible procedure to make robust individual comparisons
based on FCRFs
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Necessity part. Consider axiom A, let bi = β and
denote by bˆ the vector of n elements obtained ranking the elements of b in non-
decreasing order. Applying A we get w(bi,b) = w(β, bˆ), thus what is relevant
are the elements of vector b and not their order.
By WMA we have that if β0 > β then w(β0, bˆ) ≥ w(β, bˆ) for all ranked
distributions b whose elements include β0 and β.
Given a function w then we let Z(b,w) denote the set of all values of b such
that w(.;b) = 0, that is Z(b,w) := {bi : w(bi;b) = 0}. Note that Z(b,w) might
also be empty if w is always positive. Moreover, if there exist β0 such that
w(β0; bˆ) = 0, then by WMA it is also true that w(β; bˆ) = w(β0; bˆ) = 0 for all
β < β0 such that β belongs to vector b.
Consider SRI, then according to part (i) if w(β; bˆ) = 0 then w(β;b0) = 0 for
all b0 ∈ Bn(β).
While part (ii) of SRI, in conjunction with A, requires that, if w(β;b) > 0,
then
w(β;b)
w(β0;b)
=
w(β;b0)
w(β0;b0)
⇐⇒ w(β; bˆ)
w(β; bˆ0)
=
w(β0; bˆ)
w(β0; bˆ0)
.
It follows that the ratio w(β;b)/w(β0;b) is independent from the vector b pro-
vided that it includes the values β,β0 that is, if w(β;b) > 0 then
w(β;b)
w(β0;b)
= f(β,β0) for all b ∈ Bn(β,β0), all β0 ≥ β ∈ NH . (23)
We let n = 2H, and focus on a specific vector of achievements, denote by
bˆ0 := (1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, ..,H − 1,H − 1,H,H)
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the ordered vector where any individual exhibit a diﬀerent level of achievement
and each achievement appears twice. It follows that bˆ0 ∈ B2H(β,β0), therefore
SRI and A require that
w(β;b0)
w(β0;b0)
= f(β,β0)
moreover, since b0 includes all possible values of achievements appearing twice
then letting β00 6= β0 we have also that
w(β;b0)
w(β00;b0)
= f(β,β00).
In general, if n = 2H the function f(β,β0) coincides with w(β;b0)/w(β0;b0).
As a result SRI and A require that for a given b ∈ Bn(β,β0)
w(β;b)
w(β0;b)
=
w(β;b0)
w(β0;b0)
for all β0 ≥ β ∈ NH
that is
w(β;b) = w(β;b0) · w(β
0;b)
w(β0;b0)
for all β0 ≥ β ∈ NH (24)
since b0 is fixed then we can redefine v(β) := w(β;b0), moreover since (24) has
to hold for all β0 ≥ β ∈ NH then for a given value of β the second term on the
right hand side of (24) has to be independent from β0. That is w(β0;b)/v(β0)
should not depend from β0, but it can still in principle depend from β which is
the lower bound for the β0 values, and of course can depend from b. Thus we
have
w(β0;b)
w(β0;b0)
= g(β;b) for all β0 ≥ β ∈ NH (25)
however, unless β0 is the minimum value of the achievements in b there can
possible be plenty of potential values of β that are consistent with β0 ≥ β thus,
setting β00 = min(b) such w(β00;b) > 0 we get that restating (24) substituting
β00 for β we obtain that (25) has to hold for all β0 ≥ β00, for β00 possibly diﬀerent
from β thus g(β;b) has to be independent from β giving
w(β;b) = v(β) · φ(b) for all β ∈ NH ,b ∈ B2H(β) (26)
such that w(β;b) > 0.
In order to extend the result to all distributions such that n ≥ 2 we make
use of the RI axiom. That is for any b ∈ Bn(β) there exist a b0 ∈ B2H(β)
such that (b)2H = (b0)n where (b)r denotes a r times replication of vector b.
According to RI, if w(β;b) satisfies A, we have that
w(β;b) = w(β; bˆ) = w(β; (bˆ)2H) = w(β; (bˆ0)n) = w(β; bˆ0) = v(β) · φ(b0) (27)
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where b and b0 are made equivalent applying permutations and replications of
element. That is denoting with F (b) the distribution function of vector b, we
have that F (b) = F (b0) in (27). Thus for all n ≥ 1, letting φ˜(F (b)) := φ(b) we
have
w(β;b) = v(β) · φ˜(F (b)) (28)
if w(β;b) > 0. Recall that by WMA v(β) is non-decreasing in β.
To conclude we show that applying SRI part (i), A and RI we have that
w(β;b) = 0 where b ∈ Bn(β) if and only if w(β;b0) = 0 where b0 ∈ B2H(β).
Making use or RI there exists b0 ∈ Bn(β) s.t. b0 and b0 can be replicated
respectively according to the factors 2H and n such that the obtained dis-
tributions belong to B2H·n(β). Making use of SRI part (i) w(β; (b0)n) =
0 ↔ w(β; (b0)2H) = 0, then by RI we have w(β; (b0)n) = 0 = w(β;b0)
and w(β; (b0)2H) = 0 = w(β;b0), by applying SRI to w(β;b0) = 0, we get
w(β;b0) = 0↔ w(β;b) = 0, thus w(β;b0) = 0↔ w(β;b) = 0.
Recalling that we have defined v(β) := w(β;b0) then we can complete the
result by extending (28) also to the cases where w(β;b) = 0, obtained letting
v(β) = 0.
Note that φ(b) = 0 for some b ∈ B implies w(β;b0) = 0 for all b0 ∈ B(β).
Apply A, suppose there exist β s.t. v(β) > 0 and φ(β11) = 0, then by RI
φ(β1n) = 0 for any n ≥ 1. Let n ≥ 3, by SRI (part i) φ(b) = 0 for all
b ∈ Bn(β,β) obtained modifying the achievements of all individuals except two.
Consider b00 = (β,β,β00) ∈ B3(β,β), note that w(β00;b00) = 0 = w(β;b00) since
b00 ∈ B3(β,β) and thus φ(b00) = 0. Applying again SRI we get φ(b) = 0 for all
b ∈ B3(β,β00). Consider now b000 = (β,β000,β00) ∈ B3(β,β00), repeating the same
arguments followed φ(b00) = 0 we obtain that φ(b000) = 0 and applying again SRI
we obtain φ(b) = 0 for all b ∈ B3(β000,β00). Note that vectors b ∈ B3(β000,β00)
do not necessary include realizations of achievements β. Repeated application
of the procedure allows to conclude that φ(b) = 0 for all b ∈ B3. Similar result
can be constructed for all b ∈ Bn where n ≥ 3. Applying RI the result φ(b) = 0
can hold for any b ∈ B.
Note now that w(bi;b) = 0 for all b ∈ B(bi) is a solution of the problem
since satisfies all axioms.
To complete the proof we add WM. Axiom WM requires that φ(b) is non-
decreasing in each component of b.
The suﬃciency part of the proof requires to check that (2) satisfies A, WM,
WMA, RI, and SRI.
Proof of Proposition 1. Notice that applying MR (part ii) we obtain that
φ(b0) = φ(b) for all b,b0 ∈ B(β,H) and for all β ≤ H, since any additional
elements cannot be larger than H. Setting β = H we obtain that φ(b0) = φ(b)
for all b,b0 ∈ B(H). The set B(H) identifies an equivalence class composed by
all vectors where at least one element has value H. Consider the set of vectors
B(H − 1)\[B(H − 1) ∩ B(H)], it is also an equivalence class because adding
elements with value not larger than H − 1 to any vector in B(H − 1)\[B(H −
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1)∩B(H)] gives a vector which is still in the group, moreover according to MR
this operation does not aﬀect the evaluation of the vector, i.e. φ(b0) = φ(b) for
all b,b0 ∈ B(H − 1)\[B(H − 1) ∩ B(H)]. If H ≥ 3, next equivalence class is
obtained considering all vectors in B(H−2)\[B(H−2)∩[B(H)∪B(H−1)]. The
sequence is completed with the last element B(1)\B(1)∩ [∪Hj=2B(j)] composed
by all vectors 1n for n ≥ 1.
Note that all these equivalence classes can be associated with the value of
bmax which is the same for all the elements in a class. Thus we let φ(b) =
ψ(bmax) where ψ is non-decreasing. We have obtained (3).
According to N we have that v(1) · ψ(1) = 0, and v(H) · ψ(H) = 1.
To complete note that MR is consistent with (4), w(bi;b) = 0 for all b ∈
B(bi).
The suﬃciency part of the proof requires to check that (3) satisfies A, WM,
WMA, SRI, N, and MR.
Proof of Remark 1. Axiom IEF requires that if v(bi) · ψ(bmax) ≥ v(bi) ·
ψ(b0max) then v(bi) · ψ(max{bmax, b0}) ≥ v(bi) · ψ(max{b0max, b0}) for all b0 ∈
NH . To check that IEF is satisfied then we consider that,
(i)either v(bi) = 0, thus any evaluation of the achievement bi is equal to 0,
and IEF is satisfied,
(ii) or v(bi) > 0, thus ψ(bmax) ≥ ψ(b0max) should imply ψ(max{bmax, b0}) ≥
ψ(max{b0max, b0}).
(iia) If bmax ≥ b0max then max{bmax, b0} ≥ max{b0max, b0} thus, since ψ is
non-decreasing then IEF is satisfied.
(iib) If bmax < b0max and ψ(bmax) = ψ(b0max) then (1) either b0 ≤ bmax
implying that max{bmax, b0} = bmax < b0max = max{b0max, b0}; or (2) bmax ≤
b0 ≤ b0max implying that max{b0max, b0} = b0 ≤ b0max = max{b0max, b0}
which according toWM and ψ(bmax) = ψ(b0max) requires that ψ(b0) = ψ(b0max);
or finally (3) bmax < b0max < b0 which implies that max{b0max, b0} = b0 =
max{b0max, b0} thereby completing the proof that IEF is satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 2. Necessity: Consider the result of Lemma 1, axiom
TR requires that φ(b0) ≥ φ(b) if b0 = b∪b∗ and b∗ > z, otherwise φ(b0) = φ(b)
if b∗ ≤ z.
Note that applying TR (part ii) we obtain that if β ≤ z then φ(b0) = φ(b) =
φ(z ·1n) = φ(z) for all b,b0 ∈ Bn such that b,b0 ≤ z ·1n, where the last equality
is obtained by applying RI.
In general, making use of (4) we get φ(b0) = φ(b) if α(b, z) = α(b0, z).
Therefore α(b, z) should be considered in order to identify distributions exhibit-
ing the same value of φ. Note that according to TR (part i) φ(b0) = φ(b) for any
pair of vectors b0 ∈ Bn0 ,b ∈ Bn such that n0 ≥ n, if α(b0, z) = α(b, z)∪z1n0−n.
By applying RI we get that φ(b0) = φ(b) for all b0 ∈ Bn0 ,b ∈ Bn if either
α(b0, z) = z1n0 and α(b, z) = z1n or b0 and b exhibit the same distribution of
functioning above z. That is the valuation is made according to the distribution
of functioning in αT∗(b, z).
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Recalling that WM requires that φ(b) is non-decreasing in each argument,
then the evaluation φ(b) := ζ(αT∗(b, z)) should be non-decreasing in each
component of αT∗(b, z).
According to N we have that v(1) · ζ(z) = 0, and v(H) · ζ(H) = 1.
To complete note that TR is consistent with w(bi;b) = 0 for all b ∈ B(bi).
The suﬃciency part of the proof requires to check that (6) satisfies A, WM,
WMA, SRI, N, and TR.
Proof of Remark 3. Recalling definition of Axiom IEF then if b0 ≤ z then
αT∗(b, z) is not aﬀected and similarly is (6) thus IEF is satisfied. However if b0 >
z then IEF requires that ζ[αT∗(b∪ b0, z)] ≥ ζ[αT∗(b0 ∪ b0, z)] if ζ[αT∗(b, z)] ≥
ζ[αT∗(b0, z)] which may not be the case. For instance consider the following
specification for ζ where αT∗(b, z)max and αT∗(b, z)min respectively denote the
maximum and minimum value of αT∗(b, z) :
ζmaxmin [αT∗(b, z)] =
1
2
[αT∗(b, z)max +αT∗(b, z)min].
Note that ζmaxmin is replication invariant, symmetric and non-decreasing in each el-
ement. Suppose that z = 2, αT∗(b, 2) = (3, 5, 5, 7) and αT∗(b0, 2) = (4, 4, 4, 5),
while b0 = H = 7 then ζ
max
min
£
αT∗(b, z)
¤
= 12(7+3) >
1
2(5+4) = ζ
max
min [αT∗(b0, 2)],
while since αT∗(b ∪ 7, 2) = (3, 5, 5, 7, 7) and αT∗(b0 ∪ 7, 2) = (4, 4, 4, 5, 7) we
have ζmaxmin [αT∗(b ∪ 7, 2)] = 12 (7 + 3) <
1
2(7 + 4) = ζ
max
min [αT∗(b0 ∪ 7, 2)] thereby
violating IEF.
Another example can be presented taking ζ to coincide with the averaging
operator µ giving the mean value of a vector and letting αT∗(b0, 2) = (4), as
a result comparing averages we get µ(3, 5, 5, 7) = 5 > 4 = µ(4) while adding
b0 = 7 we get µ(3, 5, 5, 7, 7) = 5.4 < 5.5 = µ(4, 7), thereby violating IEF.
Proof of Proposition 3. Necessity: Consider the result of Lemma 1, ax-
iom TC (part i) combined with A requires that φ(b0) = φ(b) for any β ∈ NH
whenever b0,b ∈ Bn(β) are obtained changing functionings levels and rela-
tive positions of individuals without aﬀecting the ranking of those experiencing
functioning z. Applying RI the above consideration extends to all cases where
F¯b(z) is not aﬀected. That is, let β ∈ NH and b0,b ∈ B(β) then φ(b0) = φ(b)
whenever F¯b(z) = F¯b0(z).
In order to extend the result to all b0,b ∈ B, consider b0,b ∈ B(β,β0), then
axiom TC (part i) in conjunction with A and RI requires that if F¯b(z) = F¯b0(z)
then φ(b0) = φ(b) both if bj = β and if bj = β0 provided that v(β) > 0
and v(β0) > 0. Thus F¯b(z) = F¯b0(z) will imply that φ(b0) = φ(b) for any
b0,b ∈ B(β) ∪B(β0). Repeated application of the procedure extends the result
to hold for all b0,b ∈ B.
Recall that if v(bi) = 0 then w(bi;b) = 0 consistently with the specification
in (7), thus the only relevant case to check is when v(bi) > 0.
If v(bi) > 0, we have shown that F¯b(z) = k ∈ Z[0,1] identifies an equivalence
class for all b ∈ B. According to axiom TC (part ii) if b = b∗ ∪ β ∈ Bn where
β ≤ z, and b0 = b∗ ∪ β0 ∈ Bn where β0 > z then φ(b0) ≥ φ(b). Note that
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F¯b(z) = k < k + 1/n = F¯b0(z). Moreover note that for any k, k0 ∈ Z[0,1] s.t.
k < k0 there exist ρ, ρ0, n ∈ N such that k = ρ/n, k0 = ρ0/n.
Let z ∈ NH . Consider b0,b ∈ B s.t. F¯b(z) = k < k0 = F¯b0(z). Then there
exist b01,b1 ∈ Bn s.t. k = ρ/n, k0 = ρ0/n and F¯b1(z) = k < k0 = F¯b01(z). Let
bˆ1 : = (z, z, z, .....z, z| {z }
ρ
,H, ...H| {z }
n−ρ
),
bˆ01 : = (z, .., z, z| {z }
ρ0
,H,H,H, ...H| {z }
n−ρ0
),
thus bˆ1, bˆ01 are distributions of size n, ranked in non-decreasing order (obtained
re-ranking respectively b0 and b) whose first elements are z0s and the other
elements of higher value are H 0s.
Consider two cases, either (I) z < H, or (II) z = H.
(I) If z < H consider two generic distributions b0,b ∈ B, then
(I.a) as shown above, if F¯b0(z) = F¯b00(z) then by TC (part i) φ(b
0) = φ(b00)
and if F¯b(z) = F¯b0(z) then by TC (part i) φ(b) = φ(b0),
(I.b) by RI φ(b00) = φ(b01) and φ(b0) = φ(b1),
(I.c) by A φ(b01) = φ(bˆ
0
1) and φ(b1) = φ(bˆ1),
(I.d) by TC (part ii), repeated applications of comparisons where starting
from bˆ1 another distribution in considered where a functioning of value z is
replaced by another of value H, we obtain φ(bˆ01) ≥ φ(bˆ1).
Collecting all results and noticing that F¯b0(z) = F¯bˆ01(z) > F¯bˆ1(z) = F¯b(z)
we obtain that
φ(b0) = φ(b00) = φ(b
0
1) = φ(bˆ
0
1) ≥ φ(bˆ1) = φ(b1) = φ(b0) = φ(b).
Thus, if F¯b0(z) > F¯b(z) then φ(b0) ≥ φ(b).
(II) If z = H then by definition F¯b(z) = F¯b0(z) = 0 for all b0,b ∈ B. As
shown above F¯b(z) = F¯b0(z) will imply that φ(b0) = φ(b) for all b0,b ∈ B.
Thus if z = H then φ(b0) = φ(b) for all b0,b ∈ B.
To summarize, for a given z ∈ NH function φ(b) can be specified in terms
of F¯b(z), that is φ(b) := χz(F¯b(z)) where χz may depend on the value of z and
is non-decreasing in F¯b(z). Note that so fare we didn’t make use of WM which
turns out to be implied by the result.
According to N we have that v(1) · χz(0) = 0, implying v(1) = 0 since by
construction χz(.) > 0. Moreover N requires that v(H) ·χz(1) = 1 if z < H, and
if z = H we have v(H) · χH(0) = 1.
To complete note that TR is consistent with w(bi;b) = 0 for all b ∈ B(bi).
The suﬃciency part of the proof requires to check that (7) satisfies A, WM,
WMA, SRI, N, and TC.
Proof of Remark 4. Recalling definition of Axiom IEF then (7) satisfies IEF
if χ(z, F¯b∪b0(z)) ≥ χ(z, F¯b0∪b0(z)) holds if condition χ(z, F¯b(z)) ≥ χ(z, F¯b0(z))
is satisfied. Thus for a fixed z IEF requires that F¯b∪b0(z) ≥ F¯b0∪b0(z) if F¯b(z) ≥
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F¯b0(z). Let n(b) denote the size of distribution b, suppose b0 ≤ z, n(b) = 10,
n(b0) = 100 and F¯b(z) = 4/10 > 39/100 = F¯b0(z). However once we consider
distribution b ∪ b0 and b0 ∪ b0 we get F¯b∪b0(z) = 4/11 < 39/101 = F¯b0∪b0(z)
thereby violating IEF.
Proof of Corollary 2. Recalling (7) then for a given z ∈ NH the group
evaluation is non-decreasing with F¯b(z).
While according to (6) the group evaluation depends on αT (b, z) if at least
one functioning in b is above z i.e. if F¯b(z) > 0, otherwise (i.e. if F¯b(z) = 0)
αT (b, z) does not exist and the group evaluation reaches a minimum.
Note that for a given F¯b(z) > 0 then combining the two criteria the com-
position of αT (b, z) is irrelevant for the evaluation since what matters is only
F¯b(z). Moreover according to (6) the group evaluation has to satisfy RI when
applied also on αT (b, z). By replicating αT (b, z) keeping unchanged the ele-
ments of b not above the threshold z the value of F¯b(z) is increased. While by
replicating all elements not above z i.e. b\αT (b, z) while keeping fixed αT (b, z)
then the value of F¯b(z) is decreased. Note that both operations do not aﬀect
the evaluation in (6).
It can be shown that for any k ∈ Z(0,1], for a given F¯b(z) > 0 it is always
possible to replicate distribution b\αT (b, z) and replicate a diﬀerent number of
time distribution αT (b, z) s.t. for the obtained distribution b0 we have F¯b0(z) =
k.
Thus the only discriminant information is whether F¯b(z) > 0 or F¯b(z) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. In order to simplify the exposition we consider directly
a FCRF where we let bmax := m and w(bi;b) is represented by w˜(b;m) =
v(b) · ψ(m). Property WIP requires that:
v(b) · ψ(m) ≥ v(b− 1) · ψ(m0) (29)
for all b,m,m0 ∈ NH such that 1 < b ≤ m ≤ H, H ≥ m0 ≥ b − 1 ≥ 1,
m0 ∈ {m− 1,m,m+ 1}.
The non trivial case for these comparisons arises when m0 = m+1, given the
assumptions on v and ψ the condition (29) is always satisfied ifm0 ∈ {m−1,m}.
For m0 = m+ 1 we have
v(b) · ψ(m) ≥ v(b− 1) · ψ(m+ 1)
which is satisfied either if v(b− 1) = 0, or if v(b− 1) > 0 and
v(b)
v(b− 1) ≥
ψ(m+ 1)
ψ(m)
for all m ≥ b > 2.
Therefore letting b := max{b ∈ NH : v(b) = 0} we obtain
min
m≥b>b+1
½
v(b)
v(b− 1)
¾
≥ ψ(m+ 1)
ψ(m)
for any m ≤ H − 1. (30)
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Proof of Proposition 4. For expositional purposes we split the proof into
three parts.
We first consider the functions v{b,b¯} as in (21) for fixed 1 ≤ b < b¯ ≤ H and
derive the specification of the set Ψ(b, b¯) of all consistent values of ψ satisfying
WIP following Lemma (2) (see Part A).
Then we derive [see (34)] a parametric function ψ∗{b,b¯} ∈ Ψ(b, b¯) that will
turn out to be essential for characterizing together with v{b,b¯} two conditions
that guarantee robust cross group comparisons (see Part B).
We will complete the proof deriving consistently with the results in Part B
the dominance conditions specified directly comparing individual achievements
b and maximal group realizations m.
(Part A): We first specify the implications arising from applying the result
in Lemma 2 when v is specified making use of v{b,b¯}(b).
Consider (21), note that since v(H) = 1 we get also ψ(H) = 1/v(H) =
1.Then if b¯ < H we get ψ(b) = 1 for all b ∈ {b¯+ 1, b¯+ 2, ..H}.
For all b ∈ {b+ 2, b+ 3, ....b¯} we have
v{b,b¯}(b)
v{b,b¯}(b− 1)
=
b− b
b− 1− b = 1 +
1
b− 1− b
thus according to (20)
min
m≥b≥b+2
½
1 +
1
b− 1− b
¾
= 1 +
1
m− 1− b ≥
ψ(m+ 1)
ψ(m)
(31)
for any m ∈ {b+ 2, b+ 3, ....b¯}.
While for b ∈ {1, 2, .., b, b+1} we get no restrictions on ψ(b). However, since
v(b) = 0 for all b ∈ {1, 2, .., b} and the FCRF in (3) is w˜(b,m) = v(b) · ψ(m)
then the values of ψ(b) for all b ∈ {1, 2, .., b} are of no relevance for the final
evaluation. Possibly the value of ψ(b + 1) may turn out to be relevant, but
this is not the case. The only possible evaluation for which ψ(b + 1) can be
relevant is the one considering w˜(b + 1, b+ 1) = v(b+ 1) · ψ(b + 1), non trivial
between groups comparisons involve individuals with w˜(b,m) where b < b + 1
and m > b+1 but these individuals experience achievements b ≤ b therefore for
them we have w˜(b,m) = 0. Thus the value of ψ(b+ 1) > 0 does not aﬀect any
between group comparison.
(Part B): We now move to identify an algorithm to implement cross group
comparisons in terms of FCRFs. We consider the set of FCRF w˜(b,m) = v(b) ·
ψ(m) derived in Proposition 1 wherem denotes the maximal group achievement,
and b is the level of individual achievement. We make use of the result in Part A
and denote by Ψ(b, b¯) the set of all non-decreasing functions ψ > 0 s.t. ψ(H) = 1
and w˜(b,m) satisfies WIP for v{b,b¯}(b) given in (21).
40
We are interested in robust cross group comparisons holding for a given v{b,b¯}
and for all associated ψ belonging to .
Any between group nontrivial comparison in terms of FCRFs requires to
rank w˜(b,m) = v(b) · ψ(m) ≥ v(b0) · ψ(m0) = w˜(b0,m0) in particular when
b0 < b ≤ m < m0.
Letting ψ(m) = 1 for all m ∈ NH it follows that w˜(b,m) ≥ w˜(b0,m0) if and
only if v(b) ≥ v(b0).
In order to check whether the same relation holds also for other admissible
specifications of ψ ∈ Ψ(b, b¯) the condition
v(b) ≥ v(b0) max
ψ∈Ψ(b,b¯)
½
ψ(m0)
ψ(m)
¾
(32)
has to hold.
Since ψ(m0)/ψ(m) can be decomposed into the product of ratios of ψ(j +
1)/ψ(j) for j = m, ...m0 − 1 the maximum value of ψ(m0)/ψ(m) necessarily has
to coincide with the product of the maximum values of each ratio ψ(j+1)/ψ(j)
i.e.
max
ψ∈Ψ(b,b¯)
½
ψ(m0)
ψ(m)
¾
=
Ym0−1
j=m
max
ψ∈Ψ(b,b¯)
½
ψ(j + 1)
ψ(j)
¾
. (33)
From Part A we know that ψ(j) = 1 for all j ∈ {b¯+1, b¯+2, ..H} and from (31)
we have that 1 + 1j−1−b ≥
ψ(j+1)
ψ(j) for any j ∈ {b+ 2, b+ 3, ....b¯}, therefore
max
ψ∈Ψ(b,b¯)
½
ψ(j + 1)
ψ(j)
¾
=
j − b
j − 1− b .
Our aim is to identify a possibly unique function ψ∗ ∈ Ψ(b, b¯) that can be
considered as the “limiting function” among those in Ψ(b, b¯) such that v(b) ·
ψ∗(m) ≥ v(b0) · ψ∗(m0) will imply that v(b) · ψ(m) ≥ v(b0) · ψ(m0) for all ψ ∈
Ψ(b, b¯).
Because of (32), (??) and (31) the restrictions on ψ∗ require that:
ψ∗(b0)
ψ∗(b)
= max
ψ∈Ψ(b,b¯)
½
ψ(b0)
ψ(b)
¾
for all b+ 2 ≤ b < b0 ≤ H.
It follows that ψ∗(b) = 1 for all b ∈ {b¯+1, b¯+2, ..H} and ψ∗(b) = θ · (b− 1− b)
for any b ∈ {b+ 2, b+ 3, ....b¯} where θ is a constant with appropriate value s.t.
according to (20)
v{b,b¯}(b¯)
v{b,b¯}(b¯− 1)
=
ψ∗(b¯+ 1)
ψ∗(b¯)
.
Since applying (21) we have that v{b,b¯}(b¯) = 1 = ψ
∗(b¯ + 1), it follows that
ψ∗(b¯) = v{b,b¯}(b¯− 1) i.e. θ = 1/(b¯− b), thus
ψ∗(b) =
b− 1− b
b¯− b
= v{b,b¯}(b− 1)
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for all b ∈ {b+ 2, b+ 3, ....b¯}.
The set of conditions previously derived allows to recover a unique derivation
of ψ∗(b) for b ≥ b + 2, however for b ≤ b + 1 the function ψ∗ may exhibit
diﬀerent shapes provided that it is positive and non-decreasing. As argued
in Part A the values of ψ∗(b) for b ∈ {1, 2, ...b, b + 1} have no relevance in
between groups comparisons since v{b,b¯}(b) = 0 for all b ∈ {1, 2, ...b} and even if
v{b,b¯}(b+ 1) · ψ∗(b+ 1) > 0 then either
(i) b0 < b + 1 i.e. v{b,b¯}(b0) = 0, in which case v{b,b¯}(b + 1) · ψ∗(b + 1) >
v{b,b¯}(b0) · ψ∗(m0) no matter the value of ψ∗(b+ 1) and the value of m0 ≥ b0, or
(ii) b0 ≥ b + 1, which is necessarily associated with m0 ≥ b + 1 clearly
giving either v{b,b¯}(b + 1) · ψ∗(b + 1) = v{b,b¯}(b0) · ψ∗(m0) if b0 = b + 1 = m0 or
v{b,b¯}(b + 1) · ψ∗(b + 1) ≤ v{b,b¯}(b0) · ψ∗(m0) otherwise, no matter what is the
value of ψ∗(b+ 1).
As a result an admissible specification for ψ∗ is ψ∗(b) := v{b,b¯}(b − 1) for
b ∈ {b+ 2, b+ 3, .., b¯, ..H} and ψ∗(b) := v{b,b¯}(b+ 1) for b ∈ {1, 2, ..b+ 1}, i.e.
ψ∗{b,b¯}(b) =



1
b¯−b
b−1−b
b¯−b
1
if 1 ≤ b ≤ b+ 1
if b+ 1 < b ≤ b¯+ 1
if b¯+ 1 < b ≤ H
. (34)
Robust comparisons of two individuals belonging to diﬀerent groups in terms
of the FCRFs derived in Proposition 1 once v{b,b¯}(b) in (21) is applied, require
to check whether w˜(b,m) = v(b) ·ψ(m) ≥ v(b0) ·ψ(m0) = w˜(b0,m0) for v{b,b¯} and
for all ψ ∈ Ψ(b, b¯). As shown in the previous paragraphs in order to implement
these comparisons, if v{b,b¯}(b) ≥ v{b,b¯}(b0) then the specification of ψ in (34) it
is not only necessary but it is also suﬃcient. To summarize:
For a fixed pair of values {b, b¯} we have that v{b,b¯}(b)·ψ(m) ≥ v{b,b¯}(b0)·ψ(m0)
for all ψ ∈ Ψ(b, b¯) if and only if:
(i) v{b,b¯}(b) ≥ v{b,b¯}(b0), and
(ii) v{b,b¯}(b) · ψ∗{b,b¯}(m) ≥ v{b,b¯}(b0) · ψ∗{b,b¯}(m0).
Part (C): Our aim is to restate these conditions directly in terms of the
values of b,m, b0,m0.
Condition (i) requires that either (i.a) b ≥ b0 or (i.b) b, b0 ≤ b or (i.c) b, b0 ≥ b¯.
Condition (ii) turns out to be trivial either when m ≥ m0 or b = b0, and in
general if either (i.b) or (i.c) hold given that if (i.b) holds we have that the value
of the two FCRFs in (ii) is 0 and if (i.c) hold we obtain that the value of the
two FCRFs in (ii) is 1.
When b0 < b ≤ m < m0 we have a non-trivial comparison. In this case
condition (ii) requires that:
max
½
b− b
b¯− b
; 0
¾
·min
(
[m− 1− b][1]
b¯− b
; 1
)
≥ max
½
b0 − b
b¯− b
; 0
¾
·min
½
[m0 − 1− b][1]
b¯− b
; 1
¾
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that is after normalization
max {b− b; 0} ·min
n
[m− 1− b][1] ; b¯− b
o
(35)
≥ max {b0 − b; 0} ·min
n
[m0 − 1− b][1] ; b¯− b
o
.
43
